## Facts

- Eleanor Baylie and Frances L. Smith were employees of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago who alleged discriminatory denial of promotions and related opportunities.
- The claims proceeded as individual actions after a broader employment-discrimination class action against the Bank was decertified.
- The plaintiffs relied heavily on an expert statistical report asserting that Black employees were promoted at lower rates than white employees.
- The statistical showing reflected only a modest difference in promotion probabilities rather than a large disparity tied to particular decisions affecting Baylie or Smith.
- The Bank presented individualized, non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged promotion outcomes, including performance- and qualification-based explanations.
- Baylie and Smith contended the Bank’s explanations were pretextual and argued that the statistical analysis corroborated discriminatory intent.

## Issues

1. Whether Baylie and Smith produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination in promotion decisions.
2. Whether modest, aggregate statistical evidence of promotion disparities can, without strong individualized proof, create a genuine dispute of material fact in an individual discrimination case at summary judgment.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- The court held the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case because they did not provide adequate individualized evidence (including similarly situated comparators and qualification-based proof) supporting discriminatory treatment.
- The court held that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, reflecting only a small increase in the probability of discrimination, was insufficient on its own to meet the “more likely than not” requirement in an individual disparate-treatment claim.
- The court noted that a “loss-of-a-chance” damages theory might conceptually fit probabilistic proof in some contexts, but it was not sought and was described as more suitable to class-wide litigation.

## Legal Principles

- In individual disparate-treatment cases, aggregate statistics showing only a slight increase in the probability of discrimination generally cannot, standing alone, defeat summary judgment; such statistics require substantial case-specific evidence to carry the claim.
- To establish a prima facie promotion-discrimination case, a plaintiff must show qualification for the position and favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class.
- When an employer offers legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for promotion decisions, the plaintiff must produce specific evidence permitting a reasonable inference of pretext; generalized statistical patterns do not substitute for individualized proof.
- Probabilistic or “loss-of-a-chance” concepts do not automatically translate into full traditional remedies in an individual disparate-treatment framework, particularly when not pleaded or pursued.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment because Baylie and Smith did not present individualized comparator, qualification, and pretext evidence sufficient to support an inference that discrimination more likely than not caused the promotion decisions, and their modest statistical showing could not fill that gap in an individual case.


Baylie v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chi., 476 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2007)