## Facts

- Black students and parents sued in 1961 to end a deliberately segregated dual school system in Oklahoma City.
- A federal district court found intentional segregation and later concluded neighborhood zoning would not remedy the violation due to residential segregation.
- In 1972, the court imposed a comprehensive desegregation injunction requiring the “Finger Plan,” including extensive cross-busing.
- In 1977, the court found the district “unitary,” closed the case, and terminated its active jurisdiction, but did not clearly state whether the 1972 injunction was dissolved; no appeal followed.
- In 1984, citing demographic changes and busing burdens, the Board adopted a Student Reassignment Plan (SRP) that returned many elementary schools to neighborhood attendance zones, leading to more racially identifiable schools.
- Respondents moved to reopen enforcement, arguing the 1972 injunction remained effective and the SRP produced resegregation.
- The district court initially treated the 1977 order as precluding further challenge; the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the injunction had not been dissolved.
- On remand, the district court dissolved the injunction, finding long-term good-faith compliance and no discriminatory intent behind the SRP.
- The Tenth Circuit again reversed, applying a stringent modification/dissolution standard derived from United States v. Swift & Co.

## Issues

1. Whether the unappealed 1977 “unitary” order barred respondents from contesting the later dissolution of the 1972 desegregation injunction and the SRP.
2. What legal standard governs dissolution of a school desegregation injunction.
3. Whether a district court may end federal supervision when it finds constitutional compliance and an unlikely return to prior discriminatory practices.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held respondents were not barred from challenging dissolution because the 1977 order was too ambiguous to constitute termination of the 1972 injunction; termination requires a clear statement.
- The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s use of Swift’s “grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions” standard as too demanding for school desegregation decrees.
- The Court held a district court may dissolve a desegregation injunction when satisfied that the district complied in good faith for a reasonable time and eliminated the vestiges of de jure segregation to the extent practicable, such that a return to prior violations is unlikely.
- The Court did not decide whether Oklahoma City met that standard and directed the lower courts to apply it.

## Legal Principles

- A prior finding of “unitary” status does not, without a clear dissolution order, terminate an existing desegregation injunction; parties are entitled to a precise statement when a decree is ended.
- School desegregation decrees are equitable remedies intended to be temporary, lasting only as long as necessary to cure the constitutional violation.
- Dissolution turns on (1) good-faith compliance over a reasonable period and (2) elimination of vestiges of de jure segregation to the extent practicable, not on a requirement of showing “grievous wrong” from unforeseen conditions.
- Federal courts’ remedial authority is limited to curing the proven constitutional violation; racial imbalance attributable to private decisions and demographic change, without a remaining vestige traceable to the prior de jure system, does not alone justify indefinite judicial control.
- If the governing standard is met, a district court has discretion to return control of the school system to local authorities.

## Conclusion

The Court held that dissolution of a school desegregation injunction requires a clear termination order and is governed by a flexible equitable standard centered on sustained good-faith compliance and practicable elimination of vestiges of de jure segregation, rather than Swift’s stringent “grievous wrong” test, and it remanded for application of that standard.


Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)