## Facts

- Southland operated “7‑Eleven” convenience stores, typically in free-standing buildings under 5,000 square feet on small parcels along heavily traveled roads with parking directly in front.
- A county zoning ordinance defined a “quick-service food store” as a building with less than 5,000 square feet of net floor area used for retail sale of food and other items.
- The ordinance allowed quick-service food stores:
  - As of right in certain planned development districts, but only within developments approved by the county’s board.
  - As of right in specified shopping-center districts only if located within a qualifying multi-store shopping center meeting highway-access criteria.
  - In free-standing buildings in specified commercial/industrial districts only by special exception, which the board could deny as “incompatible” and could condition to mitigate impacts.
- Southland claimed the special-exception requirement unlawfully burdened it with added cost and delay not imposed on other retail uses, and that larger retail uses were permitted as of right despite potentially greater impacts.
- The county justified the classification as traffic management, asserting quick-service food stores generate frequent short trips and peak-hour turning movements that worsen congestion.
- Southland sought declaratory relief that the ordinance was unconstitutional and violated the zoning uniformity statute; the trial court ruled for Southland after an evidentiary hearing.

## Issues

1. Whether declaratory relief was available because an actual controversy existed over the ordinance’s application to Southland’s proposed uses.
2. Whether classifying quick-service food stores as uses requiring a special exception was a permissible exercise of delegated legislative zoning power.
3. Whether the ordinance’s differential treatment of quick-service food stores violated due process or equal protection.
4. Whether the ordinance violated the statutory requirement that zoning regulations be uniform for each class or kind of use within a district.
5. Whether the ordinance had to be upheld because its reasonableness was at least “fairly debatable.”

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Virginia held the circuit court had declaratory-judgment jurisdiction because a live controversy existed regarding Southland’s ability to develop under the ordinance.
- The court reversed the trial court and entered final judgment for the county, upholding the ordinance.
- The court ruled that creating a special-exception category for certain uses is a legislative determination within the county’s delegated zoning authority.
- Applying the presumption of validity and the “fairly debatable” standard, the court held the county’s evidence made the classification rationally supportable, defeating Southland’s due process and equal protection claims.
- The court held the ordinance did not violate statutory uniformity because the rules were applied uniformly to the defined class of quick-service food stores within each district.

## Legal Principles

- Zoning is a legislative power that the state may delegate to local governments.
- A locality may provide for special exceptions (special use permits) under stated standards; placing a use into a special-exception category is a legislative policy choice.
- Zoning ordinances are presumed valid; the challenger bears the burden to produce probative evidence of unreasonableness.
- If the reasonableness of a zoning classification is “fairly debatable,” courts must uphold the legislative judgment.
- Statutory uniformity is satisfied when regulations are uniform within a district for each class of use; different classes may be regulated differently if the classifications are rational and consistently applied.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Fairfax County’s ordinance requiring special exceptions for free-standing quick-service food stores in certain districts, finding the traffic-based classification at least fairly debatable, constitutionally permissible, and uniformly applied to the defined use class.


Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty. v. S. Land Corp., 224 Va. 514, 297 S.E.2d 718 (Va. 1982)