## Facts

- Beach (plaintiff) was injured in a nighttime two-vehicle collision on a New York State highway near Cobleskill.
- The collision involved (1) a truck owned and driven by Richtmyer and (2) an automobile owned by Carpenter and driven by her chauffeur, Harris.
- Carpenter was not in her automobile at the time of the accident; Beach was a passenger in Carpenter’s automobile.
- Harris was killed in the accident; Beach sued Richtmyer, Carpenter, and Harris’s estate for damages based on alleged negligence.
- At trial, Carpenter testified that Harris had been operating her automobile without her permission, suggesting he took the car without authorization.
- Carpenter’s testimony denying permission was uncorroborated, and other evidence supported the statutory presumption that a vehicle is being operated with the owner’s consent when driven by someone other than the owner.
- Over Carpenter’s objection, Harris’s administrator introduced evidence of Harris’s good character and reputation.
- The jury found Carpenter and Harris’s estate liable for Beach’s damages.
- Carpenter appealed, arguing that admitting character evidence about Harris was error and harmed her defense on the consent (and therefore owner-liability) question.

## Issues

1. In a civil negligence action arising from an automobile accident, is evidence of a deceased driver’s good character or reputation admissible as proof bearing on how he acted on the occasion in question (including whether he would have taken and driven the owner’s car without permission)?
2. If such character evidence is admitted over objection, is the error prejudicial where owner consent and resulting vicarious liability are disputed and supported by competing proof?

## Decision

- The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Harris’s good character in this civil negligence case.
- The court concluded the error was prejudicial to Carpenter because the evidence could influence the jury on the contested question whether Harris had Carpenter’s permission to use the car.
- The judgment against Carpenter was reversed, and the matter was sent back for a new trial as to Carpenter.

## Legal Principles

- In a civil negligence case, a party generally may not use evidence of a person’s general character or reputation (such as being a careful, prudent, or trustworthy driver) as substantive proof that the person acted in line with that trait on the occasion at issue.
- Character evidence in civil cases is typically limited to specific uses such as impeachment (when a witness’s credibility is attacked in a permitted manner) or when character itself is a material element of a claim or defense; ordinary auto-negligence and permission disputes do not make character an element.
- New York’s owner-liability framework includes a presumption that a vehicle operated by someone other than the owner is being driven with the owner’s consent; an owner’s bare, uncorroborated denial does not automatically remove the issue from the jury when other proof points the other way.
- When improperly admitted character evidence bears on a disputed, outcome-determinative issue such as owner consent, it can constitute reversible, prejudicial error requiring a new trial.

## Conclusion

Beach v. Richtmyer holds that, in an automobile negligence case, evidence of the deceased chauffeur’s general good character should not have been received to influence the jury’s view of disputed permission and related owner liability; because that error could have affected the verdict against the owner, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment as to Carpenter and ordered a new trial.


Beach v. Richtmyer, 90 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1949)