## Facts

- Devils Tower National Monument is a federally managed site that many Northern Plains tribes consider sacred and use for religious ceremonies, particularly in June.
- Recreational rock climbing increased substantially beginning in the 1970s, prompting concerns about resource impacts and conflicts with tribal ceremonial use.
- In 1995, the National Park Service adopted a Final Climbing Management Plan (FCMP) to manage climbing while protecting natural and cultural resources.
- The FCMP included limits on new fixed climbing hardware, trail and resource-protection measures, and seasonal route restrictions for wildlife.
- The FCMP also asked climbers to voluntarily refrain from climbing during June and implemented an educational program explaining the site’s religious significance; June climbing remained legally permitted and was not enforced through penalties.
- A multi-use association, individual climbers, and a commercial guide sued federal officials, alleging the FCMP’s June voluntary closure and educational efforts violated the Establishment Clause; they also asserted NEPA and related statutory claims.
- The district court dismissed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed on standing; the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs had Article III standing to challenge a non-mandatory, non-enforced request to avoid climbing in June and related educational messaging.
2. Whether, assuming standing, the FCMP’s voluntary June climbing pause and educational program violated the Establishment Clause by advancing or endorsing religion or coercing religious conformity.
3. Whether the FCMP violated NEPA by proceeding without an environmental impact statement.

## Decision

- The district court dismissed for lack of standing because plaintiffs failed to show a concrete, particularized injury caused by the voluntary June request or educational program.
- In the alternative, the district court held the FCMP did not violate the Establishment Clause because it served secular management goals and permissibly accommodated tribal religious practices without coercion.
- The district court rejected the NEPA challenge, concluding the agency’s environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact were sufficient.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed solely on standing and did not reach the Establishment Clause merits.
- Claims tied to proposed restrictions on commercial guiding were moot because the agency abandoned a mandatory commercial-guiding limitation before judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Article III standing requires a concrete, particularized injury in fact that is traceable to the challenged government action and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.
- A purely voluntary government request, without legal compulsion or sanctions and where the challenged activity remains permitted, generally does not create an injury in fact for standing purposes.
- Government acknowledgment of, and efforts to reduce conflict with, religious practices on public land may be treated as permissible accommodation when access for others remains available and no one is coerced to participate in religion.
- Under Establishment Clause frameworks focusing on purpose, effect, and coercion, a policy aimed at resource management and conflict reduction may be constitutional when its primary effect is not advancement of religion and it imposes no religious conformity.
- Under NEPA, an agency may proceed without an environmental impact statement when it reasonably determines, based on an environmental assessment, that the action will not significantly affect the environment.

## Conclusion

The courts left the Devils Tower FCMP in place because challengers to a voluntary, non-enforced June climbing pause failed to show an Article III injury, and the district court further concluded that the plan’s religious-sensitivity measures were a permissible accommodation rather than an unconstitutional establishment of religion.


Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff’d, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000)