## Facts

- Arthur S. Bechhoefer, a Yates County, New York resident involved in local land-use advocacy, learned information alleging drug trafficking in the Keuka Lake area and implicating several individuals, including at least one member of the Yates County Sheriff’s Department.
- On July 15, 1993, Bechhoefer contacted the DEA’s Rochester office and spoke with Agent Jeffrey Gelina, who asked Bechhoefer to send a detailed letter identifying suspected participants and sources.
- Bechhoefer asserted he wrote only after assurances of confidentiality; Gelina asserted he said he would try but could not guarantee confidentiality.
- On July 17, 1993, Bechhoefer sent a three-page letter labeled “CONFIDENTIAL,” on stationery listing his full name, address, and phone/fax numbers; the letter identified suspected drug traffickers and potential sources.
- The DEA did not meet with Bechhoefer, contact his sources, or open a formal investigation.
- At the request of a sheriff’s investigator, DEA Agent Robert Nearing faxed a copy of the letter to the Yates County Sheriff’s Department.
- After the disclosure, Bechhoefer faced three defamation suits and two criminal actions by county authorities; the defamation suits and one criminal case were dismissed, and he was acquitted in the remaining criminal case.
- Bechhoefer sued the DEA and agents, alleging that disclosure of the letter without his consent violated the Privacy Act’s limits on disclosure of a “record” contained in a “system of records.”

## Issues

1. Whether Bechhoefer’s letter, maintained by the DEA and containing identifying information and allegations about identifiable persons, constituted a “record” “about an individual” under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4).
2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment by concluding, as a matter of law, that the letter was not a Privacy Act “record” (and therefore could not support an unauthorized-disclosure claim).
3. Whether the letter could qualify as part of a “system of records” based on maintenance and retrieval by name or other personal identifier under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5).

## Decision

- The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on the Privacy Act claim and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the letter met the Privacy Act’s definition of a “record” because it was maintained by an agency and contained information linked to identifiable individuals, including names and other identifying particulars.
- The court rejected a narrow reading that would exclude information not fitting traditional biographical categories, emphasizing the statute’s broad, non-exhaustive definition.
- The court indicated the summary-judgment record did not support a categorical conclusion that the letter could not be part of a system of records, leaving further factual development for remand.

## Legal Principles

- Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4), a “record” includes any information about an individual that an agency maintains and that contains the individual’s name or other identifying particular; the statute’s listed categories are illustrative, not exhaustive.
- Information can be “about an individual” when it describes, concerns, or is linked to an identifiable person; it need not be solely or primarily about one individual.
- Materials submitted to an agency by private parties may become Privacy Act “records” once maintained by the agency.
- A document may fall within a “system of records” if it is maintained in a manner permitting retrieval by name or personal identifier, consistent with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5).
- Summary judgment is improper where the statutory definition is applied too narrowly and the record does not establish, as a matter of law, that the maintained document falls outside the Act’s coverage.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that a confidential informant letter maintained by the DEA can constitute a Privacy Act “record” because it contains identifying information and information linked to identifiable individuals, and it vacated summary judgment that had excluded the letter from the Act’s coverage, remanding for determination of whether an unlawful disclosure occurred and whether any statutory exception or defense applied.


Bechhoefer v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Drug Enf’t Admin., 209 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2000)