## Facts

- A divorce judgment incorporated the parties’ separation agreement requiring the former husband to pay alimony for fifteen years unless earlier terminated by the former wife’s (1) death, (2) remarriage, or (3) “living together with a member of the opposite sex, so as to give the outward appearance of marriage” before May 1, 1981.
- The former husband stopped paying alimony, asserting the wife triggered the cohabitation termination clause.
- The former wife filed a contempt complaint in Probate Court seeking enforcement of alleged unpaid alimony.
- The Probate Court found that, after the divorce, the wife lived intermittently at the former marital home and at an apartment leased by “J.R.”
- The Probate Court further found that from June 1978 through October 1979 the wife lived regularly with J.R. in his apartment, and from October 1979 to June 1980 she lived with him “for the most part.”
- The Probate Court found that from June 1978 through May 1981 the wife regularly cohabited with J.R., including sharing the same bedroom.
- The Appeals Court reversed, interpreting the cohabitation clause to require financial support by the cohabiting partner.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.

## Issues

1. Whether an alimony-termination clause requiring “living together … so as to give the outward appearance of marriage” includes an implied requirement that the cohabiting partner financially support the recipient spouse.
2. Whether the Probate Court’s findings established cohabitation within the meaning of the parties’ agreement, terminating the husband’s alimony obligation.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Probate Court’s dismissal of the contempt complaint.
- The court held the wife’s conduct satisfied the agreement’s cohabitation contingency before May 1, 1981, terminating alimony.
- The court rejected the Appeals Court’s interpretation that financial support by the cohabiting partner was required.

## Legal Principles

- A separation agreement incorporated into a divorce judgment is construed under ordinary contract principles, with primary weight given to the language chosen by the parties.
- Where an agreement lists distinct alternative contingencies for terminating alimony, courts should not add extra conditions (such as financial support) absent textual basis.
- “Living together … so as to give the outward appearance of marriage” may be shown by sustained shared residence and an intimate, bedroom-sharing relationship, even if the parties keep finances separate.
- Appellate review generally defers to supported trial-court findings on the nature and regularity of cohabitation when applying a contractual standard.

## Conclusion

Because the agreement did not condition termination on financial support and the trial court found sustained, marriage-like cohabitation before the specified date, the husband’s alimony obligation ended under the cohabitation clause and contempt was properly dismissed.


Bell v. Bell, 468 N.E.2d 859 (Mass. 1984)