## Facts

- John E. Bell, a long-time customer and store credit-card holder, purchased a ceiling fan for $132.16 on August 2, 1992, using a retailer-issued credit account.
- After installation, Bell concluded the fan was defective because it produced unacceptable noise and could not be fixed; the retailer did not inspect the fan to contest that claim.
- The charge appeared on a September 1, 1992 statement with payment due September 25, 1992.
- Around September 23, 1992, Bell notified the retailer that the fan was defective and that he would not pay for it.
- Bell sent a written dispute letter dated October 27, 1992, following the billing-statement dispute instructions and referencing “Regulation Z.”
- The retailer acknowledged receipt and represented it would locate a replacement and reimburse installation costs, but the parties did not finalize details and Bell was not notified that a replacement was available.
- The retailer continued billing the charge as past due, assessed late fees and finance charges, and allegedly assured Bell the problem was a mistake and would be corrected.
- The retailer reported delinquency information to credit reporting agencies, canceled Bell’s store credit card, and removed the benefits of his longstanding positive payment history with the store.
- Bell alleged that negative reporting and cancellation impaired his credit reputation and contributed to denial of other credit.
- Bell sued for (1) violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z billing-error procedures and (2) tortious interference with a credit-related business expectancy; the trial court entered summary judgment for the retailer on both counts.

## Issues

1. Whether Bell’s written notice triggered TILA and Regulation Z billing-error duties, and whether the retailer failed to comply by not reasonably investigating and by continuing adverse billing and reporting on the disputed amount.
2. Whether a consumer’s expectation of continued favorable credit standing and access to future credit can qualify as a protectable “business expectancy,” and whether the retailer’s conduct could constitute intentional interference without justification.
3. Whether genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on either claim.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Missouri (en banc) reversed summary judgment for the retailer on both counts and remanded.
- The court held the record contained triable fact issues on compliance with TILA/Regulation Z billing-error procedures after the consumer’s written dispute.
- The court held Bell presented sufficient evidence for a jury to consider tortious interference with a credit expectancy, treating a credit-related expectancy as potentially protectable.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; review is de novo with the record viewed in favor of the nonmovant.
- Under TILA § 1666 and Regulation Z, a creditor receiving timely written notice of an asserted billing error must acknowledge the dispute, conduct a reasonable investigation, and either correct the account or provide a written explanation within prescribed time limits.
- Evidence that a creditor continued to treat a disputed amount as delinquent, added charges, and reported negative information during an unresolved dispute can support liability and defeat summary judgment.
- Missouri tortious interference requires: (1) a contract or valid business expectancy, (2) defendant’s knowledge, (3) intentional interference causing breach or termination of the relationship/expectancy, (4) absence of justification, and (5) damages.
- A consumer’s reasonably anticipated access to credit, tied to an established credit history and reputation, may constitute a valid business expectancy sufficient to submit a tortious-interference claim to a jury.

## Conclusion

The court reversed and remanded because a fact-finder could determine that the retailer failed to follow federally required billing-dispute procedures and that its alleged billing and credit-reporting actions intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with Bell’s protectable credit expectancy.


Bell v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 6 S.W.3d 871 (Mo. 1999)