## Facts

- Perry Bellamy was convicted in New York Supreme Court, Queens County, for participating in the murder of a state parole officer, based on evidence he lured the victim to a location where others shot him.
- Bellamy was represented at trial (January 1987) by attorney Irwin Guran, who was under disciplinary investigation during the trial and was later suspended from practice after findings of mental infirmity and physical disability.
- After learning of the suspension, Bellamy moved to vacate his conviction under New York Criminal Procedure Law article 440, claiming ineffective assistance due to counsel’s incapacity; the state court held a hearing and denied relief.
- Bellamy filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief on Sixth Amendment, due process, and state-procedure grounds.
- A divided Second Circuit panel reversed on a per se Sixth Amendment theory.
- The Second Circuit reheard the case en banc, vacated the panel decision, and affirmed denial of habeas relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment required a per se presumption of prejudice because trial counsel was under disciplinary scrutiny and later suspended for disability, even though counsel was licensed at the time of trial.
2. Whether Bellamy established ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington (deficient performance and prejudice).
3. Whether extending any per se rule on these facts would amount to a “new rule” barred on habeas review under Teague v. Lane.
4. Whether the state post-conviction proceedings denied due process or a full and fair opportunity to litigate counsel’s competence.

## Decision

- The en banc court held the Second Circuit’s per se Sixth Amendment rule did not apply because counsel was authorized to practice law at the time of trial; later suspension for disability did not convert the trial into one “without counsel.”
- The court declined to extend the per se rule to this context and affirmed that Bellamy’s claim was governed by Strickland.
- The court agreed that Bellamy failed to show constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland.
- Because no per se extension was adopted, the court did not grant relief on any theory that would require applying a new rule under Teague.
- The court rejected Bellamy’s due process and state-hearing challenges and affirmed the district court’s denial of § 2254 relief.

## Legal Principles

- A presumption of prejudice applies only in a very narrow class of Sixth Amendment cases where circumstances are so extreme that meaningful representation is effectively impossible (e.g., representation by a person not authorized to practice law, or certain severe conflicts).
- Representation by an attorney who was licensed at the time of trial is not treated as a per se denial of counsel merely because the attorney is later disciplined or suspended for disability.
- Absent a per se category, ineffective-assistance claims are evaluated under Strickland v. Washington, requiring proof of (1) objectively unreasonable performance and (2) a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel’s errors.
- On federal habeas review, courts generally avoid announcing or applying new constitutional rules to completed state convictions when barred by Teague v. Lane, absent a recognized exception.
- State post-conviction fact-finding procedures satisfy due process where the defendant has a meaningful opportunity to develop and litigate the ineffective-assistance claim.

## Conclusion

The en banc Second Circuit denied habeas relief, holding that later suspension of a trial lawyer for disability does not trigger a per se Sixth Amendment violation when the lawyer was licensed during trial; the claim required proof of deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland, which Bellamy did not establish.


Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)