Facts
- Mrs Bellinger, a transgender woman assigned male at birth who underwent gender reassignment surgery, sought to marry her partner.
- The Registrar General refused to issue a marriage license, citing section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which defined marriage as between a man and a woman based on birth sex.
- Mrs Bellinger's challenge was dismissed by both the original court and the Court of Appeal; she appealed to the House of Lords.
- The principal issue was whether 'male' and 'female' in section 11(c) could be interpreted, using section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), to include post-transition gender, or whether a declaration of incompatibility should be issued under section 4 HRA.
Issues
- Whether section 3 of the HRA 1998 authorized courts to interpret 'male' and 'female' in section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to include individuals who had undergone gender reassignment.
- If not, whether the statutory definition of marriage should be declared incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) under section 4 HRA.
Decision
- The House of Lords held that section 3 HRA 1998 could not be used to interpret 'male' and 'female' beyond their ordinary (birth sex) meaning in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as such interpretation would represent a fundamental change, exceeding judicial function.
- The Lords declared the relevant part of the 1973 Act incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 ECHR, referencing Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002), as it failed to recognize gender reassignment for marriage purposes.
- A declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA was issued, drawing Parliament's attention to the inconsistency without altering the statute.
- The court noted this matter was suitable for legislative, not judicial, action and referenced ongoing government efforts to introduce remedial legislation.
- The Court distinguished this case from Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, highlighting the limits of interpretive powers in cases that would require a fundamental alteration to statutory concepts.
Legal Principles
- Under section 3 HRA 1998, courts must interpret legislation as compatible with ECHR rights so far as possible, but cannot fundamentally alter statutory concepts or rewrite legislation.
- Declarations of incompatibility under section 4 HRA serve to highlight legislative inconsistencies with ECHR rights, but do not invalidate the statute itself.
- The separation of powers restricts courts from enacting radical changes to established legal principles, reserving such changes for Parliament.
- The case illustrates judicial restraint in applying interpretive powers versus substantial policy change.
Conclusion
Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 confirmed that the courts could not reinterpret statutory terms in a way that fundamentally altered traditional legal concepts such as marriage; a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA was issued instead, prompting parliamentary reform to address transgender rights in UK law.