## Facts

- Van Chester Thompkins, a Michigan prisoner, was arrested and advised of his *Miranda* rights.
- During a roughly three-hour custodial interrogation, Thompkins was largely silent and did not clearly state that he wanted to remain silent or wanted a lawyer.
- Near the end of questioning, Thompkins answered “yes” when asked whether he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting.
- The trial court denied Thompkins’ motion to suppress his statements, and the jury convicted him of first-degree murder, assault with intent to murder, and related firearms offenses; he received life without parole.
- At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Eric Purifoy (the van’s driver), who had been acquitted in a separate case; in closing, the prosecutor challenged that acquittal, and defense counsel did not request a limiting instruction regarding how the jury could use that information.
- Michigan appellate courts rejected Thompkins’ *Miranda* and ineffective-assistance claims; a federal district court denied habeas relief.
- The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief, concluding the state court unreasonably found an implied waiver and unreasonably rejected the ineffective-assistance claim.

## Issues

1. Whether a suspect invokes the right to remain silent by remaining largely silent during a custodial interrogation after receiving *Miranda* warnings.
2. Whether a suspect validly waives the right to remain silent by answering an incriminating question after receiving and understanding *Miranda* warnings.
3. Whether, on federal habeas review, the state court unreasonably rejected an ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction about a witness’s prior acquittal.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and reinstated the denial of habeas relief.
- The Court held that silence during interrogation does not invoke the right to remain silent; invocation must be unambiguous.
- The Court held that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent by knowingly and voluntarily making an incriminating statement after receiving and understanding *Miranda* warnings.
- The Court held the statement was voluntary under due process standards.
- The Court held the state court’s rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim was not an unreasonable application of *Strickland* because Thompkins failed to show prejudice.

## Legal Principles

- A suspect must unambiguously invoke the *Miranda* right to remain silent; mere silence is insufficient.
- After *Miranda* warnings are given and understood, a waiver need not be express; waiver may be implied from a suspect’s voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision to speak.
- An uncoerced incriminating response following understood *Miranda* warnings generally supports a finding of waiver.
- On federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), relief is unavailable absent an objectively unreasonable state-court adjudication of the federal claim.
- Under *Strickland*, an ineffective-assistance claim fails without a reasonable probability that the result would have differed absent counsel’s asserted error; state-court no-prejudice determinations receive deference on habeas review.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a suspect’s prolonged silence during custodial questioning does not invoke the right to remain silent and that a suspect may impliedly waive that right by making a knowing and voluntary statement after receiving and understanding *Miranda* warnings; it also upheld, under habeas deference, the state court’s rejection of an ineffective-assistance claim for lack of prejudice.


Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)