## Facts

- In 2004, Renee Maria Zintgraff executed a revocable living trust naming herself as initial trustee and Christiane E. Marin as successor trustee.
- The trust directed that, at Zintgraff’s death, $5,000 be paid to a cousin and the remainder be distributed equally to four named charities.
- Zintgraff placed at least her residence and a Wells Fargo brokerage account into the trust by titling them in the trust’s name.
- The trust reserved Zintgraff’s right to revoke during her lifetime but did not specify any method for revocation.
- In 2008, Zintgraff executed a will appointing Oscar F. Bernal as personal representative and devising her tangible personal property and residuary estate to him.
- The will contained a clause revoking all other “wills, trust and codicils” previously made, but did not name the 2004 trust or specifically dispose of the trust-titled assets.
- After Zintgraff died in 2013, Bernal asserted the 2008 will revoked the trust and that the trust assets were probate assets.
- Marin, as successor trustee, sought a declaratory judgment that the trust remained valid and its assets were not part of the probate estate.
- Bernal presented extrinsic evidence of Zintgraff’s intent, including testimony from the will-drafting attorney that Zintgraff intended to revoke the trust and leave everything to Bernal, and an affidavit from a friend describing the same intent.

## Issues

1. Whether, under Fla. Stat. § 736.0602(3) (2008), a revocable trust that provides no revocation method may be revoked by a later will together with extrinsic evidence showing clear and convincing proof of the settlor’s intent.
2. Whether the trial court erred by limiting the revocation inquiry to the will’s text and granting summary judgment without considering other record evidence of intent.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the final declaratory judgment and summary judgment entered for Marin and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the trial court misinterpreted § 736.0602(3) by treating the will, standing alone, as the only permissible evidence of revocation.
- Because the trust did not specify a revocation method, the statute allowed revocation by “any other method” that manifests clear and convincing evidence of intent, which could include the will plus extrinsic evidence.
- The record evidence, if unrebutted, could support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Zintgraff intended to revoke the trust, making summary judgment improper.

## Legal Principles

- Under Fla. Stat. § 736.0602(3), when a revocable trust does not provide a revocation method, the settlor may revoke “by any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent.”
- A court may consider extrinsic evidence (including attorney testimony and affidavits) to determine whether the clear-and-convincing standard is met under the statute’s “any other method” provision.
- A later will that broadly purports to revoke prior “trusts” may contribute to proof of revocation, but the analysis is not confined to the will’s text when the statute permits other evidence of intent.
- Summary judgment is improper where the record contains evidence that could allow a factfinder to determine, under the governing clear-and-convincing standard, that the settlor intended to revoke the trust.

## Conclusion

The court held that when a revocable trust specifies no revocation method, Florida law permits revocation by any method proven by clear and convincing evidence of intent; therefore, the will and extrinsic evidence had to be considered together, and summary judgment declaring the trust unrevoked was reversed and remanded.


Bernal v. Marin, 196 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)