## Facts

- In 1980, Lee M. Jackson consumed alcohol at a restaurant operated by Adanac, Inc. (Cactus Jack’s), then crashed his car with Michael Louis Bervoets as a passenger, causing severe injuries.
- Jackson was a minor for purposes of purchasing alcohol; the contribution claim alleged Adanac was negligent per se in serving him and that the service was a proximate cause of Bervoets’s injuries.
- Bervoets sued Jackson and his parents for negligence; Jacksons and their insurer (Safeco) filed a third-party claim against Adanac seeking contribution under Tennessee’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA).
- In 1983, the Jacksons and Safeco settled with Bervoets for $1,250,000; the settlement released all of Bervoets’s claims against all defendants.
- The contribution action proceeded: a first defense verdict was set aside; a second plaintiff verdict was reversed on appeal due to instructional error and juror misconduct.
- While the case remained pending for retrial, Tennessee adopted comparative fault in McIntyre v. Balentine (1992); Adanac moved to dismiss, arguing UCATA contribution no longer governed.

## Issues

1. Whether the pending contribution action should be governed by UCATA or by Tennessee’s comparative fault regime.
2. Whether the settling defendants/insurer had a vested right to pursue a UCATA-style contribution remedy that barred applying comparative fault to the pending retrial.

## Decision

- The Tennessee Supreme Court modified the intermediate court’s ruling and held the action must be tried under comparative fault principles rather than UCATA.
- The Court rejected the claim that the settling defendants/insurer had a vested right to UCATA contribution.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with comparative fault.

## Legal Principles

- After adoption of comparative fault, allocation of responsibility among multiple tortfeasors in trials occurring after that adoption is governed by comparative fault, even if the case began under UCATA.
- Traditional UCATA contribution is limited in a comparative fault system because liability is generally apportioned by percentage of fault rather than imposed jointly and severally.
- A statutory contribution mechanism is remedial/allocational in nature and does not create a constitutionally protected vested right that prevents applying comparative fault rules to a pending case scheduled for retrial.

## Conclusion

The court required that the post-McIntyre retrial proceed under comparative fault rather than UCATA contribution and held that the settling defendants and their insurer had no vested right to insist on UCATA’s allocation method.


Bervoets v. Harde Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1994)