## Facts

- Richard Biegas drove a dump truck with a flatbed trailer carrying a backhoe eastbound on I-96 in Michigan at night.
- The backhoe struck an overpass despite being capable of being secured below the clearance height.
- Biegas immediately pulled onto the right shoulder, stopped to inspect for damage, and exited his vehicle; his employee Nick Cohen also exited.
- Quickway’s tractor-trailer driver, Lonnie Dailey, later struck and killed Biegas near the shoulder/roadway edge.
- Evidence conflicted on whether Biegas was fully on the shoulder or partly in the traffic lane, and on how far right Dailey’s truck traveled.
- Cohen made an on-scene statement indicating he warned Biegas to get out of the road because he would be hit; the statement was admitted at trial for limited purposes.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment that Biegas was at least 51% at fault and instructed the jury it had to assign him at least 51% fault; the jury allocated 53% fault to Biegas and 47% to Quickway.

## Issues

1. Whether it was error to decide on summary judgment that Biegas was at least 51% comparatively at fault and to bind the jury to a minimum 51% fault allocation.
2. Whether Michigan law recognizes a standalone gross-negligence claim in an ordinary private motor-vehicle negligence case.
3. Whether admitting Cohen’s out-of-court statements (including the warning to Biegas) was an abuse of discretion under the hearsay rules.
4. Whether Dailey’s written statement to his employer two days after the accident was protected work product as prepared in anticipation of litigation.

## Decision

- Reversed the partial summary judgment on comparative fault and vacated the mandatory minimum 51% fault instruction.
- Remanded for a new trial because factual disputes required the jury to determine comparative fault without a judicially imposed minimum percentage.
- Affirmed dismissal of the Estate’s gross-negligence claim.
- Affirmed the challenged evidentiary rulings, including admission of Cohen’s statements.
- Affirmed the ruling that Dailey’s post-accident statement was not protected by the work-product doctrine.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment requires viewing evidence in the nonmovant’s favor; courts may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations when material facts are disputed.
- Comparative-fault apportionment is generally a jury question when reasonable factfinders could differ on relative negligence.
- In Michigan, “gross negligence” is not generally a separate common-law tort in ordinary private motor-vehicle negligence litigation absent a specific statutory context.
- Out-of-court statements offered to show their effect on the listener (e.g., notice of danger) are not hearsay; alternatively, statements made under stress from a startling event may qualify as excited utterances.
- Work-product protection under Rule 26(b)(3) applies only if the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation; routine post-accident business reporting does not, without more, satisfy that standard.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit held that disputed facts made it improper to fix Biegas’s comparative fault at 51% or more as a matter of law and to compel the jury to adopt that minimum, requiring a new trial; it otherwise upheld the rejection of a standalone gross-negligence claim, the admission of key statements for non-hearsay or exception purposes, and the denial of work-product protection for a routine post-accident driver statement.


Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2009)