## Facts

- Michael J. Biestek, a former construction worker, sought Social Security disability benefits, alleging he could not work due to degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression.
- At an administrative hearing, a vocational expert (VE) testified that Biestek could perform certain sedentary, unskilled jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and provided job-number estimates.
- On cross-examination, Biestek requested the private labor market surveys and data the VE said she relied on; the VE refused to produce them, citing confidentiality, and the ALJ declined to compel production.
- The ALJ denied benefits for the relevant period, relying at step five on the VE’s testimony about job availability and numbers.
- The district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a categorical rule that VE testimony cannot be “substantial evidence” if underlying data are withheld.
- The Supreme Court granted review to address whether such VE testimony can satisfy the “substantial evidence” standard under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

## Issues

1. Whether a vocational expert’s job-availability and job-number testimony can constitute “substantial evidence” under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) when the expert refuses, upon request, to produce the underlying private survey data.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court held that a VE’s refusal to provide underlying private survey data does not categorically prevent the testimony from qualifying as “substantial evidence.”
- The substantial-evidence determination remains case-by-case, based on the entire record, including the VE’s explanations, cross-examination, and the ALJ’s credibility findings.
- The Court concluded that, on this record, the ALJ could credit the VE’s testimony despite nonproduction of the surveys.

## Legal Principles

- “Substantial evidence” under § 405(g) means more than a mere scintilla and such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
- Whether evidence is substantial is evaluated case-by-case on the whole record; courts defer to the ALJ’s factfinding and may not reweigh evidence.
- In Social Security hearings, VE testimony may constitute substantial evidence even without supporting data in the record; the absence of disclosed data bears on weight and credibility rather than creating an automatic legal insufficiency.
- § 405(g) sets a standard of judicial review and does not create a procedural entitlement to obtain a VE’s private market-survey materials.

## Conclusion

The Court held that vocational expert testimony about job numbers may satisfy the substantial-evidence standard even when the expert declines to produce underlying private survey data; nonproduction is a credibility factor for the ALJ and reviewing courts to assess in context, not a per se bar to reliance on the testimony.


Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019)