## Facts

- In 1962, Helen Hooper Brown conveyed coastal land to the State of California for use “in perpetuity as a public park,” subject to express restrictive covenants.
- A deed provision (Paragraph 9) stated that, “notwithstanding” Public Resources Code § 5003.5, “no private right of way for vehicular travel ... shall ever be granted” across the conveyed property to serve privately owned land, while preserving the state’s ability to provide public access.
- Another provision (Paragraph 11) characterized the restrictions as conditions of delivery and stated that acceptance by the state constituted full acceptance of those conditions.
- The land became Julia Pfeiffer Burns State Park.
- Big Sur Properties later acquired inland private land and sought a permit for vehicular access across the park to reach its property.
- The Department of Parks and Recreation, through its director, refused to process or grant the application, concluding the deed restriction prohibited any private vehicular right-of-way across the park.
- Big Sur Properties petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Department to consider and exercise discretion under § 5003.5; the trial court denied relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the deed restriction barring private vehicular rights-of-way across the park, expressly applicable “notwithstanding” Public Resources Code § 5003.5, is valid and enforceable against the state.
2. Whether § 5003.5 required or permitted the Department to consider and potentially grant Big Sur Properties a private vehicular access permit despite the restriction.
3. Whether mandamus could compel the Department to process the application and exercise discretion where the requested action would violate a binding condition on the state’s title.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the writ of mandate.
- The court held the restrictive covenant was valid and bound the state because the state accepted the land subject to that condition.
- Because the condition eliminated lawful authority to grant a private vehicular right-of-way across the park, the Department had no discretion under § 5003.5 to grant or consider the requested permit in contravention of the deed.
- Mandamus was unavailable because it cannot compel an agency to act unlawfully or to exercise discretion that does not exist.

## Legal Principles

- A public entity that accepts a land gift subject to express conditions and restrictive covenants is bound by those conditions unless they are unlawful or contrary to public policy.
- A donor may condition a conveyance to limit uses of a particular parcel, and the state may accept or reject the gift on the stated terms; acceptance creates a binding limitation on the state’s proprietary control of that property.
- A general, permissive statutory authorization to grant access rights-of-way does not override a specific, accepted deed restriction that expressly applies “notwithstanding” the statute.
- Mandamus will not issue to compel an agency to perform an act it lacks legal authority to perform or to “exercise discretion” where controlling law removes the power to grant the requested relief.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the Department’s refusal to process a private vehicular access request across state park land because the state accepted the park property subject to a valid deed condition prohibiting such rights-of-way, leaving no lawful discretion that mandamus could compel.


Big Sur Props. v. Mott, 62 Cal. App. 3d 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)