## Facts

- Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) excludes certain state misdemeanors punishable by two years or less.
- Daniel Binderup pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania to corrupting a minor, a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment; he received three years’ probation and no jail time.
- Binderup’s conduct involved a consensual sexual relationship with a 17-year-old employee; he had no other disqualifying criminal history and lived lawfully thereafter.
- Julio Suarez pleaded guilty in Maryland to carrying a handgun without a license, a misdemeanor punishable by 30 days to three years; he received a suspended sentence and no imprisonment.
- Suarez had no subsequent relevant convictions and sought to possess firearms for lawful purposes.
- Both filed Second Amendment as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1); district courts granted summary judgment for each challenger, and the government appealed.
- The Third Circuit consolidated the cases and heard them en banc.

## Issues

1. Whether § 921(a)(20) or related provisions removed the challengers’ convictions from § 922(g)(1), avoiding the constitutional question.
2. Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to individuals with decades-old, nonviolent misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than one year.
3. If the challengers’ conduct is protected, whether applying § 922(g)(1) to them survives means-end scrutiny.

## Decision

- The en banc court affirmed the summary judgments for Binderup and Suarez.
- The court held both challengers fell within the text of § 922(g)(1) and were not exempt under § 921(a)(20).
- Applying the circuit’s two-step Second Amendment framework, the court concluded the challengers rebutted the presumption that their convictions were “serious” enough to place them outside Second Amendment protection.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the government failed to show a sufficient fit between permanently disarming these challengers and the asserted public-safety interest.
- § 922(g)(1) was held unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez, without invalidating the statute on its face.

## Legal Principles

- A person may bring an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) notwithstanding the statute’s general constitutionality.
- Under the Third Circuit’s two-step framework: (1) determine whether the law burdens conduct within the Second Amendment’s historical scope; (2) if it does, apply appropriate means-end scrutiny (often intermediate scrutiny).
- Individuals convicted of “serious” crimes are presumptively outside the Second Amendment’s scope, but the presumption can be rebutted in an as-applied challenge.
- “Seriousness” depends on offense characteristics rather than felony/misdemeanor labels; relevant considerations include the statutory maximum, violence or firearm involvement, actual sentence, time elapsed, and subsequent law-abiding conduct.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must show an important interest and a reasonable fit between the challenged application and that interest; generalized assertions of risk may be insufficient where the record shows long-term law-abiding conduct and nonviolent convictions.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that permanently disarming two individuals based on decades-old, nonviolent misdemeanors punishable by more than one year violated the Second Amendment as applied, because their offenses were not shown to be “serious” enough to remove them from the Amendment’s protection and the government failed intermediate scrutiny.


Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc)