## Facts

- Thomas J. Biondi was chairman of a New Jersey state licensing board regulating master plumbers.
- At a public board meeting, the board announced discipline against a master plumber, including fines, restitution, and an inactive five-year license suspension.
- During public comment, Antoine Nassimos criticized the board’s handling of the matter and questioned Biondi’s affiliations.
- Biondi alleged Nassimos stated, in substance, that Biondi had “mob connections” and would “order a hit” on Nassimos if he continued complaining.
- Biondi filed a slander action against Nassimos (and others), alleging the statement accused him of organized-crime membership and serious criminal conduct.
- The case proceeded to trial; the jury deadlocked and a mistrial was declared.
- After the mistrial, the trial court granted Nassimos summary judgment, dismissing Biondi’s claim.

## Issues

1. Whether accusing the chairman of a state licensing board of “mob connections” and ordering a “hit” constitutes slander per se by imputing serious criminal conduct.
2. Whether a plaintiff in Biondi’s position was required to prove actual injury, notwithstanding slander-per-se doctrine.
3. Whether the record contained sufficient competent evidence of actual, compensable harm to survive summary judgment after a mistrial.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment for Nassimos.
- The court treated the statement as defamatory and within traditional slander per se because it imputed serious criminality.
- Because the statement was made in a public meeting about governmental regulatory action and Biondi held a public governmental role, constitutional limits required proof of actual injury.
- The evidence of reputational harm or emotional distress was too conclusory and non-specific to permit a damages award.
- A renewed summary-judgment motion after a mistrial was procedurally proper; without a triable showing of actual injury, the claim could not proceed.

## Legal Principles

- Statements imputing serious criminal conduct can qualify as slander per se under common-law categories.
- In defamation actions involving public officials (and speech on matters of public concern), presumed damages are constitutionally constrained; plaintiffs must prove actual injury with competent evidence.
- Actual injury may include proven reputational harm, community standing damage, or substantiated emotional distress, but it cannot rest on speculation or mere inference from the defamatory character of the words.
- After a mistrial, a court may grant summary judgment if the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, still fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element such as damages.

## Conclusion

Although the alleged accusation was defamatory and of a type traditionally treated as slander per se, the claim was dismissed because the public-official plaintiff failed to present competent evidence of actual, compensable injury, and summary judgment entered after the mistrial was affirmed.


Biondi v. Nassimos, 300 N.J. Super. 148, 692 A.2d 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)