## Facts

- On September 29, 1979, Lyntellus Brooks (and an accomplice) robbed a savings and loan in Arlington, Virginia.
- Arlington County police issued an emergency broadcast describing the suspects and a possible getaway vehicle described as a green Dodge Dart or Plymouth Duster with District of Columbia license plates.
- Arlington County Police Officer Michael Kyle positioned himself along an escape route and observed a light-green car driven by a man who resembled a suspect from a prior robbery photograph; a woman was in the passenger seat.
- Kyle began following the car and continued as it traveled toward the District of Columbia via the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge.
- After entering the District, Kyle activated his overhead lights and siren. The suspect vehicle exited onto the E Street ramp and briefly stopped; Brooks exited the car with his hands raised.
- Kyle did not succeed in making an arrest. Brooks returned to the car and fled, and Kyle resumed the pursuit into downtown Washington, D.C.
- The pursuit proceeded at high speed in the District of Columbia despite Arlington County police regulations that prohibited high-speed pursuits in the District.
- During the chase, Brooks’s car collided with another vehicle; the impact ultimately pinned Alvin Biscoe, Jr., an uninvolved bystander, against a light pole.
- Biscoe suffered catastrophic leg injuries: one leg was severed and the other was so severely injured that it later required amputation. His wife, Eleanor Biscoe, asserted a derivative claim.
- The Biscoes sued Kyle and Arlington County in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging negligence in the pursuit and county liability under respondeat superior and negligent training and supervision.
- A jury found Kyle negligent and found Arlington County liable both vicariously and directly for negligent training/supervision, awarding approximately $4 million.
- Arlington County and Kyle appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing (among other points) that Virginia sovereign immunity should bar or limit liability.

## Issues

1. Whether District of Columbia tort law governed claims for injuries suffered in the District, or whether Virginia law (including Virginia sovereign immunity doctrines) controlled.
2. Whether the District of Columbia was constitutionally required to recognize Virginia sovereign immunity for Arlington County in a District of Columbia action based on conduct causing injury in the District.
3. Whether Kyle’s conduct during the pursuit and attempted stop was discretionary (and thus immune) or ministerial under the relevant immunity analysis.
4. Whether the applicable standard of care for Kyle’s conduct was gross negligence rather than ordinary negligence, and whether any claimed instructional error was preserved for appellate review.
5. Whether the evidence supported the jury’s findings of county liability under respondeat superior and for negligent training and supervision.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the plaintiffs.
- District of Columbia law governed the tort claims arising from injuries that occurred in the District, and the District was not required to apply Virginia’s sovereign immunity rules to bar recovery.
- Relying on Nevada v. Hall, the court concluded that a forum is not constitutionally compelled to extend another state’s immunity when doing so would conflict with the forum’s policies governing tort recovery for injuries within its borders.
- Kyle was not protected by discretionary-function immunity on these facts; the pursuit involved the execution of operational police duties, and the record included evidence of a clear departmental rule barring high-speed pursuits in the District.
- The court rejected the argument that a gross-negligence standard controlled and held that ordinary negligence principles under D.C. law applied; in any event, challenges to the jury instructions were not properly preserved and were treated as waived.
- The evidence supported the jury’s determinations that Kyle’s negligence proximately caused the injuries and that Arlington County was liable both vicariously and for negligent training and supervision.

## Legal Principles

- A forum may apply its own tort law to injuries occurring within its territory, including its own rules on governmental liability, even when the defendants are governmental entities from another jurisdiction.
- Under Nevada v. Hall, the Constitution does not require a forum to grant another state (or its political subdivisions) sovereign immunity in the forum’s courts for a tort occurring in the forum.
- Discretionary-function immunity does not extend to operational police conduct when it consists of carrying out established duties subject to specific departmental rules; violation of such rules supports treating the conduct as ministerial for immunity purposes.
- Absent a preserved and meritorious challenge to the jury charge, appellate courts generally will not reverse based on claimed instructional error.
- A local government may be held liable for an officer’s negligence within the scope of employment (respondeat superior) and may also face direct liability for negligent training and supervision when supported by the evidence.

## Conclusion

Biscoe v. Arlington County upheld a jury verdict holding a Virginia county and its police officer liable in negligence for a high-speed pursuit that continued into the District of Columbia and resulted in devastating injuries to an innocent bystander. The D.C. Circuit applied District of Columbia law, declined to import Virginia sovereign immunity into a District-based tort action, treated the officer’s pursuit as non-immune operational conduct in light of specific departmental limits, and affirmed county liability both vicariously and for negligent training and supervision.


Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 238 U.S. App. D.C. 206 (1984)