## Facts

- Brenda Bjorndal sued Jay Weitman for negligence after an automobile collision on Highway 22 in Linn County, Oregon.
- Bjorndal, driving about 50 mph, saw her father on the roadside and rapidly decelerated to about 10 mph in roughly one second as she prepared to turn left into a snowpark/stopping area.
- Weitman had followed behind Bjorndal for approximately twenty minutes without evidence of tailgating.
- Weitman saw Bjorndal’s father gesturing and, believing there might be a hazard, briefly looked away to scan for danger; when he looked back, he saw Bjorndal had slowed sharply.
- Weitman braked and, seeing no oncoming traffic, attempted to pass on the left as Bjorndal began her left turn; the vehicles collided.
- Over Bjorndal’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on a “sudden peril/emergency” doctrine in addition to standard reasonable-care negligence instructions.
- The jury returned a defense verdict, finding Weitman not negligent; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether, in an ordinary automobile negligence case, giving a “sudden emergency” instruction in addition to standard reasonable-care instructions is erroneous because it inaccurately states and confuses Oregon negligence law.
2. Whether giving the emergency instruction was prejudicial and required reversal and remand.

## Decision

- The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that the emergency instruction is an inaccurate and confusing supplement to the ordinary reasonable-care instruction and should not be given in ordinary vehicle negligence cases.
- The court concluded that the instruction likely confused the jury about the governing standard of care and substantially affected the plaintiff’s rights.

## Legal Principles

- Oregon negligence turns on a single standard: whether the actor failed to exercise reasonable care measured by what a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would do in the same or similar circumstances.
- “Same or similar circumstances” already includes conditions such as time pressure, perceived hazards, and unexpected events; no separate emergency standard is required.
- A “sudden emergency” instruction risks implying a distinct or relaxed standard of care (including by stating the actor is “not negligent” if the choice is one a reasonable person “might” make, even if not “the wisest”).
- Jury instructions that misstate the law or are likely to confuse jurors on the applicable standard of care constitute reversible error when they substantially affect a party’s rights.

## Conclusion

The Oregon Supreme Court held that ordinary negligence instructions already require jurors to evaluate conduct in light of all circumstances, including emergencies, and that a separate “sudden emergency” instruction misstates and confuses the law in routine automobile negligence cases; its use warranted reversal and remand.


Bjorndal v. Weitman, 184 P.3d 1115 (Or. 2008)