## Facts

- Carolyn Bobb, a bankruptcy attorney, was called as a prospective juror in a municipal court criminal trial.
- During voir dire, the judge asked Bobb questions about her marital status and her husband’s occupation.
- Bobb objected that the marital-status inquiry was being directed only to women, not to similarly situated men.
- The judge acknowledged the gender-specific questioning and repeatedly instructed Bobb to answer.
- Bobb respectfully refused to answer the marital-status and spouse-occupation questions, explaining her objection as unequal treatment based on sex.
- The judge summarily held Bobb in contempt and she was taken into custody; she was released shortly thereafter on the condition she return for sentencing.
- At the later hearing, Bobb requested a continuance to obtain counsel and conduct research; the court denied the request and imposed a contempt sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether a prospective juror may be summarily held in contempt for refusing to answer voir dire questions posed in a sex-discriminatory manner.
2. Whether the municipal court exceeded constitutional and statutory limits on summary contempt by punishing Bobb’s refusal to comply with discriminatory voir dire questioning.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court’s judgment denying review.
- The court annulled the municipal court’s contempt adjudication.
- The court concluded Bobb’s refusal to answer questions asked only of women did not support summary contempt.
- The court treated Bobb’s conduct as a conscientious, non-disruptive objection to unequal treatment rather than an obstruction of proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Summary contempt is a narrow, drastic power limited to conduct that actually obstructs proceedings or directly threatens the court’s ability to function.
- A court may not use contempt to compel compliance with a practice that applies voir dire questioning on a sex-discriminatory basis.
- Questions that may be permissible if asked in a gender-neutral manner may become constitutionally improper when selectively imposed on one sex.
- A respectful, reasoned refusal grounded in an equal-protection objection to discriminatory treatment is materially different from disruptive defiance and may not be punished as contempt on these facts.

## Conclusion

The court set aside a summary contempt order imposed on a prospective juror who refused to answer marital-status and spouse-occupation questions asked only of women, holding that contempt could not be used to enforce discriminatory voir dire practices and that the record did not show the type of obstruction required for summary punishment.


Bobb v. Municipal Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)