## Facts

- Linda A. Boblitt and Steven B. Boblitt cohabited beginning in 1983; Linda alleged Steven began verbally abusing her at that time.
- In 2004, Linda filed a marital dissolution action and sought spousal support, alleging Steven’s emotional, physical, and sexual abuse impaired her ability to work and should be considered under Family Code § 4320(i).
- In 2007, while the dissolution proceeding was pending, Linda filed a separate civil action seeking damages for domestic violence under Civil Code § 1708.6.
- In 2008, the family court awarded Linda spousal support of $2,000 per month for eight months, described Steven as “intimidating,” and expressed skepticism about some allegations without making a clear domestic-violence finding.
- Linda appealed the dissolution judgment.
- While that appeal was pending, Steven moved for judgment on the pleadings in the tort action, arguing res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the domestic-violence claims based on the dissolution judgment.
- The trial court granted the motion, reasoning Linda had raised or could have raised all domestic-violence allegations in the dissolution proceeding, and entered judgment for Steven.

## Issues

1. Whether a dissolution judgment that is currently on appeal is “final” enough to support claim preclusion or issue preclusion in a separate tort action.
2. Whether a spousal-support request in dissolution proceedings that relies on alleged domestic violence involves the same “primary right” as a tort claim for damages for domestic violence under Civil Code § 1708.6.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the pleadings and remanded with directions to deny Steven’s motion.
- A judgment on appeal is not final for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel and therefore could not preclude the tort action.
- Even assuming finality, claim preclusion did not apply because spousal support in dissolution and tort damages for domestic violence protect different primary rights.
- The court rejected Steven’s contention that Linda waived her arguments and reached the merits.

## Legal Principles

- For claim preclusion and issue preclusion, the predicate judgment must be final; a judgment subject to direct attack by appeal is not final for preclusion purposes.
- Under California’s primary-right doctrine, a “cause of action” depends on the harm suffered and the right invaded, not merely the facts alleged or legal theories asserted.
- A dissolution court’s spousal-support determination (including consideration of domestic violence as a statutory factor) and a civil action for damages for domestic violence vindicate distinct rights and seek different relief; overlap in underlying facts does not, by itself, merge them into one cause of action.

## Conclusion

The court held that preclusion could not rest on a dissolution judgment still on appeal and, independently, that a spousal-support claim in dissolution proceedings is not the same cause of action as a domestic-violence tort claim for damages because each involves a different primary right; the tort case was allowed to proceed.


Boblitt v. Boblitt, 190 Cal. App. 4th 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)