## Facts

- Stanley and Joyce Boim sued under the Anti–Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), for the 1996 murder of their son, David Boim, a U.S. national killed near Jerusalem in an attack attributed to Hamas.
- Plaintiffs alleged that U.S.-based organizations and individuals provided financial or material support to Hamas, enabling its terrorist activities, including the attack that killed David.
- Key defendants included Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), American Muslim Society (AMS), Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI), and Muhammad Abdul Hamid Khalil Salah.
- The district court entered partial summary judgment on liability against certain defendants, and a jury awarded $52 million, which was trebled to $156 million under the ATA.
- A Seventh Circuit panel vacated and remanded, questioning whether § 2333 authorizes secondary liability and whether causation was too attenuated; the court reheard the case en banc.

## Issues

1. Whether § 2333(a) authorizes civil secondary liability (aiding and abetting or conspiracy) for providing support to terrorists.
2. Whether providing money or material support to a terrorist organization can itself qualify as an “act of international terrorism” under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).
3. What mental state is required for civil liability under § 2333 when the defendant is a donor or supporter.
4. What causation standard applies under § 2333’s “by reason of” requirement, including whether plaintiffs must trace particular funds to the specific attack.
5. Whether the evidence supported liability for specific defendants, including Salah, given timing and the proof of qualifying conduct.

## Decision

- The en banc Seventh Circuit vacated the panel decision and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- The court held that § 2333 does not create secondary liability as such, but a defendant may be liable as a primary violator if its own conduct meets the statutory definition of “international terrorism.”
- The court concluded that knowingly (or with deliberate indifference) providing material support to Hamas could qualify as “international terrorism” because it violates material-support criminal statutes and is dangerous to human life in light of Hamas’s terrorist campaign.
- The court held that plaintiffs need not prove that a particular donation financed the specific killing; it is sufficient to show defendants’ support substantially contributed to Hamas’s capacity to commit terrorist acts that injured a U.S. national.
- As to Salah, the court found insufficient evidence tying his relevant conduct during the critical period to the statutory requirements for liability for this attack and reversed as to him in part, remanding for further proceedings consistent with the clarified standards.
- The court rejected certain procedural and evidentiary challenges, including a claim of collateral estoppel on knowledge and an objection to expert testimony attributing responsibility for the murder to Hamas.

## Legal Principles

- 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) does not provide aiding-and-abetting or conspiracy liability by statutory silence; liability must rest on the defendant’s own conduct satisfying the definition of “international terrorism.”
- Providing money or material support to a terrorist organization can constitute an “act of international terrorism” under § 2331(1) when the support violates material-support statutes and, given the organization’s character, is dangerous to human life.
- A donor/supporter’s civil liability under § 2333 requires proof of knowledge or deliberate indifference regarding the donee organization’s terrorist activities; strict liability is not imposed for unwitting support.
- Causation under § 2333’s “by reason of” standard does not require tracing specific dollars to the specific attack; it can be satisfied by proof that the defendant’s support was a substantial factor in the terrorist organization’s ability to carry out attacks that caused the plaintiff’s injury.
- Defendant-specific liability must respect temporal and evidentiary limits; plaintiffs must prove qualifying, culpable conduct within the relevant period and tied to the statutory elements.

## Conclusion

The en banc court held that the ATA permits primary civil liability for those who knowingly or with deliberate indifference provide material support to a terrorist organization, treating such support as “international terrorism,” while rejecting freestanding secondary-liability theories and applying a substantial-factor causation standard that does not require tracing funds to a particular attack.


Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc)