## Facts

- The case involved allegations of defamation published in a newspaper, asserting the plaintiff, a businessman, had engaged in fraudulent conduct.
- The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent further publication of the alleged defamatory statements, fearing irreparable harm to his reputation.
- The defendant argued the statements were true and that preventing their publication would unjustly restrict free expression and matters of public interest.
- The dispute was heard by the Court of Appeal, led by Lord Justice Lindley.

## Issues

1. Whether the court should grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent further publication of alleged defamatory statements before trial.
2. Whether interlocutory restraint on publication unjustifiably restricts the defendant's right to free speech in the absence of clear indefensibility.
3. Whether the risk of reputational harm to the plaintiff outweighs the interest in permitting public debate.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal declined to grant the interlocutory injunction.
- The court held that such an injunction in defamation cases should only be granted if it is clear that no defence of justification or privilege could succeed.
- It was emphasized that determining the truth or falsity of statements is a matter for trial and pre-trial restraint risks anticipating the final decision.
- The judgment highlighted the need to allow defendants a full opportunity to present their evidence and arguments.

## Legal Principles

- Interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases will only be granted if the statement is manifestly indefensible, i.e., no possible defence of justification, privilege, or fair comment.
- Courts must exercise caution to avoid unduly restricting freedom of expression prior to a full trial.
- The burden rests on the claimant to demonstrate that the defence cannot possibly succeed before the court will restrain publication.
- The decision reflects the principle that alleged defamatory statements should ordinarily be tested at trial rather than by preemptive injunction.

## Conclusion

Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 established the enduring principle that interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases are to be granted only in the clearest cases where no defence could succeed, ensuring protection of reputational interests while safeguarding free expression until the matter can be resolved at trial.
