## Facts

- R. G. Booker was injured in an automobile collision on August 2, 1978 and pursued a personal-injury claim against Midpac Lumber Co., Ltd. and other defendants.
- On or about August 11, 1978, Booker retained attorney D. N. Ingman under a contingent-fee arrangement providing Ingman one-third of any recovery in Booker’s lawsuit.
- Ingman performed the work to start the case and took additional early steps, including filing the complaint, preparing answers to defendants’ lengthy interrogatories (submitted December 18, 1978), and filing an amended complaint (December 22, 1978).
- Ingman later filed a statement of readiness and a short pretrial statement (February 9, 1979).
- Ingman did not conduct formal discovery and did not try the case.
- Before the case concluded, Booker discharged Ingman without legal cause and hired a different law firm.
- On March 28, 1979, Ingman filed a notice of attorney’s lien in the Midpac case to secure payment of attorney’s fees based on his fee contract with Booker.
- Booker asked the trial court to determine the amount owed to Ingman and terminate the lien.
- At the fee hearing, Ingman argued the court should consider the contingent-fee contract and, in effect, award him a share of the one-third contingent fee based on the portion of total attorney time he had spent compared with new counsel’s time.
- Ingman also stated his view that Booker’s case was worth more than $100,000.
- The trial court rejected those considerations because the underlying case had not been resolved and stated it would not consider the case’s value, focusing only on “what [Ingman] did.”
- Based solely on the court’s assessment that Ingman spent about 25 hours on the matter, the trial court awarded Ingman $1,500 and left the fee dispute resolved on that basis.
- Ingman appealed from the fee determination.

## Issues

1. When fixing a reasonable fee for a contingent-fee lawyer discharged without cause before the case ends, may the court base the award only on hours worked and refuse to consider the contingent-fee contract and the value of the underlying claim?

## Decision

- The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaiʻi reversed the $1,500 fee award and remanded.
- The court held the trial court manifestly abused its discretion by explicitly refusing to consider two relevant factors in setting a reasonable fee: the contingent-fee agreement and the value of Booker’s claim.
- The appellate court ruled that time spent is a factor, but it cannot be treated as the only permissible measure of reasonableness in this setting.

## Legal Principles

- A lawyer retained under a contingent-fee agreement who is discharged without legal cause before completion of the case is entitled to a reasonable fee (quantum meruit), not automatic payment of the full contract percentage.
- A reasonable-fee determination in this context requires consideration of multiple factors; the court may not treat legally relevant considerations as categorically irrelevant.
- The contingent-fee agreement is relevant evidence bearing on what constitutes a reasonable fee, even though the contingency has not yet occurred and the contract percentage is not mechanically applied.
- The value of the underlying claim (the amount at stake and expected recovery) is also relevant to reasonableness because it relates to the economic expectations and risk allocation reflected in contingent-fee work.
- A trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses, as a matter of approach, to consider relevant factors and instead limits the fee analysis to a single measure such as estimated hours.

## Conclusion

Booker v. Midpac Lumber Co. Ltd holds that when a contingent-fee attorney is fired without cause before the case ends, the attorney’s recovery is limited to a reasonable fee, but the trial court must consider more than the attorney’s time alone; refusing to consider the contingent-fee contract and the claim’s value is an abuse of discretion requiring reversal and remand for a new fee determination.


Booker v. Midpac Lumber Co. Ltd, 636 P.2d 1359 (1981)