## Facts

- Repsie Rhea Boone consulted Dr. M. M. Mullendore for abdominal cramps and bloating.
- On July 6, 1976, Boone was admitted to Colbert County Hospital for exploratory surgery performed by Dr. Mullendore.
- During surgery, Dr. Mullendore discovered and removed cysts from Boone’s fallopian tubes and ovaries.
- Dr. Mullendore dictated an operative summary stating that Boone’s left and right fallopian tubes were removed.
- Boone alleged Dr. Mullendore told her that both fallopian tubes had been removed and that she was sterile.
- Relying on that statement, Boone did not use contraception.
- Boone later became pregnant and, in April 1978, delivered a healthy child.
- Boone and her husband sued Dr. Mullendore and the hospital, alleging negligent representation that Boone was sterile or, alternatively, negligent failure to remove the fallopian tubes.
- Boone sought compensatory damages, including medical expenses related to pregnancy and delivery and the costs reasonably incurred to rear the child.
- Before trial, Mr. Boone withdrew as a plaintiff, and Boone reached a pro tanto settlement with the hospital for $1,500, which the parties conceded equaled her pregnancy-and-delivery medical expenses.
- After the settlement, the trial court granted Dr. Mullendore’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that, as a matter of law, Boone could not recover more than $1,500 in damages.
- Boone appealed.

## Issues

1. In an action alleging negligent treatment or negligent misrepresentation that a patient is sterile, may the plaintiff recover more than pregnancy-and-delivery medical expenses when a healthy child is born?
2. Does a pro tanto settlement for pregnancy-and-delivery medical expenses require limiting the plaintiff’s damages against a non-settling physician to the settlement amount as a matter of law?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment and remanded.
- The court held the trial court erred by limiting Boone’s recovery, as a matter of law, to the $1,500 medical-expense amount.
- The court treated the claim as a traditional medical malpractice/negligence action and refused to resolve the measure of damages by a categorical rule at the summary-judgment stage.
- The pro tanto settlement did not, by itself, cap Boone’s potential recovery against Dr. Mullendore; it operated as a partial satisfaction/credit against any later judgment.
- The court did not finally determine the full measure of damages recoverable in this type of case, but it made clear that damages were not restricted to out-of-pocket medical expenses alone.

## Legal Principles

- Claims based on negligent sterilization or negligent misrepresentation of sterility are analyzed under ordinary negligence/medical malpractice principles (duty, breach, proximate cause, and compensatory damages).
- A court may not impose an automatic damages ceiling in a wrongful-pregnancy negligence case and dispose of the case by summary judgment on that basis.
- Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant.
- The “benefit” of having a healthy child is not treated as eliminating damages as a matter of law for injuries tied to the pregnancy and delivery; damages questions generally remain for the factfinder under applicable tort rules.
- A pro tanto settlement with one defendant is a partial satisfaction that reduces any later recovery by credit; it does not automatically bar additional damages from a non-settling defendant.

## Conclusion

Boone v. Mullendore holds that a trial court may not end a wrongful-pregnancy medical negligence case by ruling, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s damages are limited to pregnancy-and-delivery medical expenses already covered by a $1,500 pro tanto settlement; the Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for the physician and remanded for further proceedings on damages under ordinary negligence principles, with the settlement serving only as a credit against any recovery.


Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (1982)