Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (1964)

Facts

  • Charley Stanford, a self-admitted thief, stole a topcoat from a parked automobile in Oklahoma City and took it to his home.
  • Stanford called John Fletcher Booth, Jr. and told Booth he had the coat Booth wanted and would sell it to him for $20; they arranged to meet at Stanford’s house later that morning.
  • Before the meeting occurred, police spotted Stanford wearing the coat, arrested him, and took the coat into police custody (recovering it for the owner).
  • Stanford agreed to cooperate with police. Officers arranged for Stanford to proceed with the planned meeting without telling Booth about the arrest and recovery of the coat.
  • Police officers hid in Stanford’s home while Stanford met Booth as scheduled.
  • During the meeting, Stanford told Booth the coat was stolen. Booth indicated that was acceptable and paid Stanford $20 for the coat.
  • Police immediately arrested Booth and charged him by information with receiving stolen property.
  • At trial, the court ruled Booth could not be convicted of receiving stolen property because once stolen goods are recovered by the owner or the owner’s agent (including police), the goods are no longer considered “stolen” for purposes of the receiving-stolen-property statute.
  • The jury nonetheless convicted Booth of the lesser offense of attempted receipt of stolen property and assessed a sentence of imprisonment and a fine.
  • Booth appealed his attempt conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.

Issues

  1. Whether a defendant may be convicted of attempted receipt of stolen property when, at the time of the attempted receipt, the property had been recovered by police and therefore no longer had the legal status of “stolen property.”
  2. Whether this circumstance is a legal impossibility that bars attempt liability because the completed act, even if carried out as intended, would not constitute the crime of receiving stolen property.

Decision

  • The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Booth’s conviction for attempted receipt of stolen property.
  • The court held that the coat lost its character as “stolen” once recovered by police for the owner, so Booth could not be guilty of receiving stolen property.
  • Because the completed offense was legally impossible at the time of the staged transaction, Booth also could not be guilty of an attempt to commit that offense.
  • The court reversed with instructions to dismiss the prosecution.
  • Where stolen goods are recovered by the owner or the owner’s agent before a sale, the goods are no longer considered “stolen,” and a purchaser cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property.
  • A defendant cannot be convicted of an attempt unless, if the attempt had succeeded exactly as intended, the defendant could have been convicted of the completed crime.
  • If the intended completed act would not be a crime as a matter of law, there is no punishable “attempt” (legal impossibility is a defense to attempt).
  • Legal impossibility differs from factual impossibility: when the law removes an element of the offense (here, the “stolen” status of the property after recovery), attempt liability does not attach.

Conclusion

Because the police recovered the coat for the owner before Booth took possession, the coat was no longer legally “stolen,” eliminating an element required for receiving stolen property; since Booth’s intended conduct could not have been criminal even if completed, the court treated the case as legal impossibility and reversed the attempt conviction with instructions to dismiss.