## Facts

- Gerald Bostock worked for about 10 years as a child-welfare advocate for Clayton County, Georgia, and received positive performance reviews.
- After Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league, the county criticized his sexual orientation and later fired him for conduct “unbecoming” a county employee.
- Bostock sued in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging he was fired “because of” sex.
- The federal district court dismissed Bostock’s complaint, reasoning that Title VII did not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed under its prior precedent.
- In a separate case, Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, was fired shortly after he mentioned he was gay; the Second Circuit held Title VII barred sexual-orientation discrimination.
- In another case, Aimee Stephens, a funeral home employee who had presented as a man at work, was fired after informing her employer that she intended to live and work as a woman; the Sixth Circuit held Title VII barred discrimination based on transgender status.
- Because federal circuits reached conflicting results, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided Bostock’s case together with *Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda* and *R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC*.

## Issues

1. Does Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of … sex” prohibit an employer from firing an employee for being homosexual?
2. Does Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination “because of … sex” prohibit an employer from firing an employee for being transgender?
3. Under Title VII, is it enough that sex is one but-for cause of the firing, even if other considerations also motivated the employer?

## Decision

- Yes. In a 6–3 decision authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held that “[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII.”
- The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit in Bostock’s case and affirmed the Second and Sixth Circuits in the Zarda and Stephens cases, then remanded for further proceedings.
- The Court reasoned from the statutory text: Title VII bars adverse action against an individual “because of” that individual’s sex, which calls for a but-for causation inquiry.
- If changing the employee’s sex would have changed the outcome, sex is a but-for cause of the decision, and Title VII is violated, even if the employer points to additional reasons.
- The Court stated it was not deciding questions about bathrooms, locker rooms, or similar workplace policies, and it left questions involving religious-liberty defenses (including possible interaction with RFRA) for future cases.

## Legal Principles

- Under Title VII, “because of” denotes but-for causation: liability may attach when sex is one but-for cause of the challenged action, even if other factors also contributed.
- Title VII protects individuals; it is not a defense that an employer treats men and women as groups similarly if a particular employee’s sex made a difference in the decision.
- Firing a worker for being gay necessarily involves sex because the employer penalizes attraction to persons of the same sex, which requires reference to the employee’s sex to apply.
- Firing a worker for being transgender necessarily involves sex because the employer penalizes an employee for identifying or presenting in a way that differs from sex assigned at birth, and the employer’s decision turns on sex-based distinctions.
- Courts apply Title VII’s enacted text according to ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment; lawmakers’ expected applications in 1964 do not control when the statutory language yields a clear result.
- An employer cannot avoid Title VII by relabeling the reason for discharge as “sexual orientation” or “transgender status” when sex remains part of the causal chain that produced the adverse action.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of … sex” is violated when an employer fires an employee for being gay or transgender, because sex is a but-for cause of such a discharge even if other reasons are asserted, and it reversed Bostock’s loss while affirming the pro-employee rulings in the consolidated cases.


Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)