Facts
- Mr. Young, a motorcyclist, collided with a car due to his own negligence, resulting in his death.
- Mrs. Bourhill, the claimant, was exiting a tram approximately fifty feet from the accident and did not witness the collision itself.
- After hearing the crash and following the removal of Mr. Young's body, Mrs. Bourhill approached the scene and saw its aftermath.
- At the time, Mrs. Bourhill was eight months pregnant and later gave birth to a stillborn child.
- She claimed to have suffered nervous shock and psychiatric injury as a result of the incident, bringing an action against Mr. Young's estate for negligence.
- The key issue was whether Mr. Young owed a duty of care to Mrs. Bourhill regarding psychiatric harm caused by the accident.
Issues
- Whether Mr. Young owed a duty of care to Mrs. Bourhill as a secondary victim who did not directly witness the accident but suffered psychiatric harm from its aftermath.
- Whether psychiatric injury in these circumstances was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
- Whether there was sufficient proximity between the claimant and the defendant to justify the imposition of a duty of care for psychiatric harm.
Decision
- The House of Lords found that Mr. Young did not owe a duty of care to Mrs. Bourhill for psychiatric harm.
- It was determined that it was not reasonably foreseeable that someone in Mrs. Bourhill’s position would suffer psychiatric injury as a result of the accident.
- The court concluded that Mrs. Bourhill lacked sufficient proximity to the event, as she was not in direct physical danger nor did she witness the collision.
- The judgment emphasized the distinction between physical and psychiatric harm and the limited circumstances in which a duty of care for psychiatric injury may arise.
Legal Principles
- A duty of care in negligence requires both reasonable foreseeability of harm and a sufficiently proximate relationship between claimant and defendant.
- The law distinguishes between primary victims (directly involved in the incident) and secondary victims (witnesses or those suffering due to witnessing the event or its aftermath).
- For secondary victims to recover for psychiatric injury, the harm must be reasonably foreseeable, and there must be proximity to the event or immediate aftermath.
- Liability for psychiatric harm to secondary victims is limited; not all those emotionally affected by a negligent act are owed a duty of care.
- The principle of proximity and foreseeability in secondary victim psychiatric harm claims was later further developed in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310.
Conclusion
Bourhill v Young established that a defendant does not owe a duty of care for psychiatric harm to a secondary victim unless the harm was reasonably foreseeable and the claimant was sufficiently proximate to the event. The judgment set stringent limits on liability in negligence for psychiatric injury to secondary victims, influencing subsequent case law on the scope of duty of care.
