## Facts

- Sachiko T. Bower and Frederick R. Weisman had a long personal and business relationship that later ended.
- Bower alleged that, during the relationship, she provided personal, social, and business assistance to Weisman in exchange for promises of financial support and an economic interest in his affairs for herself and her daughter.
- After the relationship ended, Bower claimed Weisman reaffirmed these promises and that the parties made additional oral and written agreements, which Weisman later breached.
- A major point of conflict involved a Manhattan townhouse owned by Weisman where Bower had been living; after the breakup, Bower alleged Weisman took steps to remove her or interfere with her continued occupancy.
- Bower sued Weisman and related entities, asserting contract and quasi-contract theories along with tort claims, including fraud and claims labeled as trespass, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and private nuisance.
- Defendants sought (1) a more definite statement because the complaint allegedly lumped defendants together and failed to specify which defendant did what, (2) dismissal of the fraud count for failure to plead with particularity, and (3) dismissal of the tort counts for failure to state a claim.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaint was so vague—particularly in attributing alleged conduct to specific defendants—that the court should require a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).
2. Whether Bower pleaded fraud with the specificity required by Rule 9(b), including the contents of the misrepresentations and the circumstances showing reliance.
3. Whether the complaint stated plausible claims (under Rule 12(b)(6)) for trespass, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and private nuisance based on the alleged conduct surrounding Bower’s removal from, or loss of, the townhouse.

## Decision

- The court granted a motion for a more definite statement, directing Bower to replead with greater clarity as to which defendant was responsible for which acts and which allegations supported each count.
- The court dismissed the fraud claim for failure to plead the circumstances of the alleged fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b), granting leave to replead.
- The court dismissed Bower’s tort claims for trespass, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and private nuisance for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted.
- The court allowed Bower’s remaining non-fraud, non-tort theories (grounded in the alleged agreements and related equitable doctrines) to proceed, subject to the clarified pleading ordered under Rule 12(e).

## Legal Principles

- Under Rule 12(e), a court may require a more definite statement when a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that a defendant cannot reasonably be required to frame a response, including where a multi-defendant complaint fails to identify who did what.
- Rule 9(b) requires a fraud plaintiff to plead the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity—typically the content of the alleged misrepresentations, who made them, when and where they were made, and facts showing reliance and resulting injury.
- Under Rule 12(b)(6), a tort claim may be dismissed when, even assuming the pleaded facts are true, the elements of the tort are not satisfied.
- Trespass generally requires an intentional entry onto land in the possession of another without permission or legal justification; pleading deficiencies arise where the plaintiff does not allege a legally protected possessory interest that can be trespassed upon by the defendant.
- False imprisonment requires intentional confinement without consent and without legal justification; allegations that do not amount to actual confinement are insufficient.
- Intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law requires extreme and outrageous conduct and severe distress; courts dismiss claims alleging conduct that, while hostile or unfair, does not meet that high threshold.
- Private nuisance generally involves a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land; claims framed as nuisance may fail where the pleaded interference does not fit nuisance doctrine.

## Conclusion

In Bower v. Weisman, the federal court required Bower to replead with clearer, defendant-specific allegations, dismissed her fraud claim for failing to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard (with leave to replead), and dismissed her tort claims for trespass, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and private nuisance for failure to state legally sufficient claims, while permitting her remaining agreement-based theories to continue in a clarified complaint.


Bower v. Weisman, 639 F. Supp. 532 (1986)