## Facts

- Black parents and guardians brought long-running federal litigation to desegregate Richmond, Virginia public schools.
- After *Green v. County School Board*, plaintiffs sought additional relief on March 10, 1970; the School Board conceded its existing plan was unconstitutional.
- The district court considered alternative desegregation plans and approved the School Board’s third proposed plan on April 5, 1971.
- On May 26, 1971, the district court awarded plaintiffs expenses and attorneys’ fees for work performed from March 10, 1970, to January 29, 1971.
- At the time of the award, there was no express statutory authorization for fee shifting in school desegregation cases; the district court relied on findings of unreasonable delay by the School Board and a “private attorney general” rationale.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that fee awards to advance legislative policy require congressional authorization.
- While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted § 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, authorizing courts to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in school desegregation cases “when appropriate upon entry of a final order.”

## Issues

1. Whether § 718 authorizes an attorneys’ fee award for services performed before its enactment when the fee issue remained pending on appeal when § 718 became effective.
2. Whether applying § 718 in that posture constitutes impermissible retroactive application or results in “manifest injustice.”

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court held § 718 could be applied to sustain fees for pre-enactment services where the propriety of the fee award was still pending on appeal when the statute became law.
- The Court applied the general rule that courts apply the law in effect at the time of decision absent clear contrary congressional intent or “manifest injustice.”
- The Court treated the fee provision as remedial, affecting litigation cost allocation rather than imposing new duties governing the parties’ underlying conduct.
- The Court concluded that applying § 718 in this pending case did not create manifest injustice and aligned with Congress’s policy supporting private enforcement of desegregation mandates.

## Legal Principles

- Absent contrary statutory direction or clear legislative intent, courts generally apply the law in effect at the time they render a decision, unless doing so would cause “manifest injustice.”
- Fee-shifting provisions directed to prevailing-party attorneys’ fees are commonly characterized as remedial/procedural measures governing litigation costs, and may apply in pending cases even when the work predates enactment.
- In school desegregation litigation, Congress may authorize fee awards to facilitate enforcement of constitutional rights, including through “private attorney general” enforcement by successful plaintiffs.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 718’s attorneys’ fee authorization applied to the pending desegregation litigation and could support an award for legal services performed before enactment because the fee dispute remained on appeal and application of the statute caused no manifest injustice.


Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974)