## Facts

- Carol Bradway received two units of whole blood during reconstructive facial surgery at Emory University Hospital on April 7, 1983.
- The hospital obtained the blood from the American National Red Cross, a not-for-profit blood bank supplying blood for medical treatment.
- On July 19, 1988, Bradway was informed she was infected with HIV and had AIDS.
- On April 19, 1989, Carol and David Bradway sued, alleging the Red Cross negligently screened donors and tested blood for HIV, including by failing to ask potential donors whether they were homosexual.
- The Red Cross removed the case to federal court; the district court dismissed as untimely under Georgia’s medical malpractice statute of ultimate repose.
- The Eleventh Circuit certified to the Georgia Supreme Court whether such claims are “actions for medical malpractice” under Georgia law; the Georgia Supreme Court answered yes.

## Issues

1. Whether negligence claims against a not-for-profit blood bank for collecting and supplying blood, including donor screening and HIV testing, constitute an “action for medical malpractice” under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-70 and 9-3-71.
2. If the claims sound in medical malpractice, whether Georgia’s five-year statute of ultimate repose bars the suit filed more than five years after the alleged negligent acts.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
- Applying the Georgia Supreme Court’s answer, the court treated the claims as medical malpractice governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71.
- The alleged negligent acts occurred no later than April 7, 1983; the five-year repose period expired in April 1988.
- Because the suit was filed on April 19, 1989, it was barred by the statute of repose, regardless of the July 1988 diagnosis.

## Legal Principles

- Under Georgia law, claims alleging negligent collection and supply of human blood by a blood bank, including donor screening and HIV testing, are medical malpractice actions subject to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71.
- Georgia’s medical malpractice statute of ultimate repose runs from the date of the alleged negligent act or omission, not from injury or discovery.
- A statute of repose operates as an absolute bar that is not tolled or revived by later events, including delayed discovery of injury.

## Conclusion

The court held that Georgia classifies negligence claims against a blood bank for donor screening and HIV testing as medical malpractice, and the five-year statute of ultimate repose extinguished the Bradways’ claims before diagnosis and before suit was filed, requiring dismissal as time-barred.


Bradway v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 992 F.2d 298 (11th Cir. 1993)