## Facts

- A collective bargaining agreement between the National Football League and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) expired on March 11, 2011 after extended negotiations.
- The League publicly stated that, absent a new agreement, it would institute a lockout in which players would not be paid and would be barred from club facilities.
- Shortly before expiration, players voted to disclaim the NFLPA’s status as their collective-bargaining representative.
- On March 11, 2011, a group of current and prospective players filed suit in the District of Minnesota on behalf of a proposed class, alleging that a lockout would constitute a concerted refusal to deal and price-fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and related law.
- On March 12, 2011, the League implemented the lockout.
- The district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the lockout, concluding it had authority to do so and that preliminary-injunction requirements were met.
- The League appealed; the Eighth Circuit ultimately vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded.

## Issues

1. Whether § 4(a) of the Norris–LaGuardia Act deprived the district court of power to enjoin the League’s lockout as conduct arising out of a “labor dispute.”
2. Whether the players’ disclaimer of union representation removed the controversy from the Norris–LaGuardia Act’s definition of a “labor dispute,” permitting injunctive relief on antitrust claims.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded.
- The court held that the Norris–LaGuardia Act barred federal injunctive relief against the lockout because the controversy remained a “labor dispute” concerning terms or conditions of employment.
- The court concluded the district court’s injunction did not satisfy the Act’s limits and procedures governing injunctions in labor disputes.
- The court declined to decide other arguments raised on appeal, including antitrust merits and the scope of any labor-related antitrust exemption.
- A dissent would have upheld the injunction, reasoning the disclaimer and antitrust framing warranted narrower application of the Norris–LaGuardia Act.

## Legal Principles

- Section 4(a) of the Norris–LaGuardia Act removes federal court power to enjoin specified conduct, including a lockout, when undertaken by a party to a labor dispute.
- “Labor dispute” is defined broadly to include controversies over terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether a union currently serves as the employees’ bargaining representative.
- A post-disclaimer dispute may still qualify as a labor dispute if it concerns wages and other working conditions; relabeling the controversy as antitrust does not, by itself, avoid Norris–LaGuardia’s anti-injunction limits.
- When the Norris–LaGuardia Act applies, injunctive relief is unavailable absent compliance with the Act’s statutory prerequisites and procedures governing labor-dispute injunctions.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit held that a professional sports lockout implemented after CBA expiration arose from a labor dispute and therefore could not be enjoined under the Norris–LaGuardia Act, even though players had disclaimed union representation and sought relief under federal antitrust law.


Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011)