## Facts

- The West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection’s director approved multiple permits for mountaintop-removal coal mining operations in West Virginia.
- The permits authorized mining practices that generated large quantities of spoil and involved disposing of that material in nearby valleys, with alleged effects including water pollution and harm to wildlife and streams.
- The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) creates a regulatory scheme in which either a state or the federal government regulates surface coal mining within a state, but not both at the same time.
- Under SMCRA, once the Secretary of the Interior approves a state regulatory program, the state gains primary authority (“primacy”) and exercises exclusive jurisdiction over surface coal mining regulation in that state unless the Secretary withdraws approval.
- In 1981, the Secretary granted West Virginia primacy; West Virginia enacted its own surface-mining law and regulations that mirrored SMCRA’s requirements.
- Patricia Bragg, other West Virginia residents, and the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy sued the state director and, in related claims, officials of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
- The plaintiffs alleged the director routinely issued permits without making the environmental findings required by West Virginia’s approved program and by federal minimum standards.
- The federal district court ruled against the director on the merits and issued an injunction limiting disposal of mining spoil near certain streams.
- The director appealed; consolidated appeals also placed before the Fourth Circuit questions concerning the continued validity of a district court–approved consent decree resolving some claims.

## Issues

1. Whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal-court action by private plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against the West Virginia environmental regulator concerning administration of West Virginia’s SMCRA primacy program.
2. Whether the Ex parte Young exception allowed the suit to proceed on the theory that the director was violating federal law, even though the challenged duties arose under an approved state program.
3. Whether the district court could leave in place a previously approved consent decree resolving certain claims even if sovereign immunity required dismissal of the claims against the state official.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit held the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal suit against the West Virginia official because the requested relief would, in substance, require a federal court to direct a state officer’s compliance with state law governing a primacy program.
- The court vacated the district court’s injunction entered against the state official.
- The court remanded with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint against the state official without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to pursue any available remedies in state court.
- The court affirmed the district court’s approval of the consent decree resolving certain claims.

## Legal Principles

- The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits in federal court against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities when the relief sought is effectively against the state, unless the state consents or Congress validly abrogates immunity.
- Ex parte Young permits suits for prospective relief against state officials only to stop an ongoing violation of federal law; it does not permit federal courts to order state officials to comply with state law.
- Under SMCRA’s primacy framework, once a state program is approved, the state—through its own statutes and regulations—administers the surface-mining program within the state unless and until federal approval is withdrawn through the statute’s specified federal oversight process.
- When a plaintiff’s theory of relief depends on how a primacy state applies and enforces its approved program, a federal injunction directing the state official’s permitting decisions can amount to federal enforcement of state law, triggering sovereign immunity limits.
- A consent decree may remain effective to the extent it resolves claims within federal jurisdiction and is not itself barred by sovereign immunity.

## Conclusion

In Bragg v. Robertson, the Fourth Circuit concluded that private plaintiffs could not use federal court to obtain injunctive relief directing West Virginia’s environmental regulator to administer West Virginia’s SMCRA primacy program in a particular way, because the Eleventh Amendment barred that suit and Ex parte Young did not apply where the relief would enforce state-law duties; the court therefore vacated the injunction and ordered dismissal without prejudice as to the state official while affirming a separate consent decree resolving certain claims.


Bragg v. Robertson, 248 F.3d 275 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002)