## Facts

- Christy Ann Breen and Dahlia Carrasco worked for Carlsbad Municipal Schools in New Mexico.
- Breen and Carrasco alleged that odors and dust in their work environment triggered a conditioned psychological response that left them unable to continue working.
- In August 1999, a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) entered compensation orders awarding both workers temporary total disability benefits based on their psychological response to the workplace conditions.
- Carlsbad Municipal Schools and the New Mexico Public Schools Insurance Authority previously appealed; the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the compensation orders in a memorandum opinion issued in 2001.
- After the appellate mandate issued, the employer/insurer paid benefits totaling 100 weeks of compensation under New Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) provisions governing “primary mental impairment.”
- Breen and Carrasco then applied for supplementary compensation orders, arguing the original awards were “ongoing” and not limited to 100 weeks.
- After a hearing, the WCJ determined that each worker’s disability was a “primary mental impairment” and concluded the WCA limited their benefits to 100 weeks; the WCJ denied additional benefits.
- Breen and Carrasco appealed from the WCJ’s denial of supplementary compensation orders.

## Issues

1. Did the WCJ err by refusing to enforce the original compensation orders (as previously affirmed on appeal) as “ongoing” awards not limited to 100 weeks?
2. Do the WCA provisions limiting compensation for a primary mental impairment to 100 weeks violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the equal protection guarantee of the New Mexico Constitution?
3. Does the 100-week limitation for primary mental impairment benefits violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCJ’s orders denying the applications for supplementary compensation orders.
- The court held the prior appellate mandate did not require payment beyond the WCA’s statutory maximum; the original “ongoing” temporary total disability awards remained subject to the 100-week limitation applicable to primary mental impairment.
- The court held the 100-week cap for primary mental impairment benefits did not violate equal protection under either the federal or state constitution under rational-basis review.
- The court held the challenged WCA provisions did not violate the ADA because the statute did not exclude mentally impaired workers from coverage, but instead set the duration of benefits available under the workers’ compensation scheme.

## Legal Principles

- A WCJ’s compensation order awarding temporary total disability benefits is constrained by statutory limits; language describing benefits as “ongoing” does not authorize payments beyond an applicable cap set by the WCA.
- The “law of the case” and an appellate mandate bind the tribunal on remand as to matters actually decided, but they do not expand benefits beyond what the governing statute permits absent an explicit directive.
- When a statutory classification does not involve a suspect class and does not burden a fundamental right, equal protection challenges are reviewed under rational-basis scrutiny.
- Under rational-basis review, the Legislature may treat primary mental impairments differently from physical impairments in workers’ compensation benefits if the classification is reasonably related to legitimate governmental aims such as administrability, verification concerns, and cost control.
- The ADA does not require a state workers’ compensation program to provide identical benefit durations for all types of disabilities where the program provides access and coverage and the challenged provisions function as a benefit-definition rule rather than an exclusion from participation.

## Conclusion

The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the WCJ’s denial of supplementary compensation orders, holding that Breen and Carrasco’s disabilities were primary mental impairments subject to a 100-week statutory limit, that the prior appeal did not mandate benefits beyond that cap, and that the cap did not violate equal protection or the ADA.


Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, 67 P.3d 908 (2003)