Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970)

Facts

  • Phillip A. Breunig drove a truck eastbound on Highway 19 near Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, when Erma Veith’s car entered the eastbound lane while traveling westbound.
  • Breunig attempted to pull to the right to avoid a head-on collision; Veith’s vehicle struck the left rear of his truck.
  • Veith’s insurer asserted Veith was not negligent because, just before the collision, she was seized without warning by a mental delusion that prevented conscious control of the car.
  • Evidence indicated Veith experienced delusional beliefs while driving, including that God was directing the steering wheel and that she could become airborne by accelerating.
  • After the incident, Veith appeared unresponsive and was hospitalized; she was diagnosed with acute paranoid-type schizophrenia.
  • Evidence also showed Veith had experienced prior mental disturbances for years, including religious hallucinations affecting her work and daily life.

Issues

  1. Whether insanity or an insane delusion at the time of a collision can defeat a negligence claim against the driver.
  2. Whether sudden mental incapacity can excuse negligence in the same manner as sudden physical incapacity when it occurs without prior notice.
  3. Whether evidence supported submitting to the jury the question of Veith’s prior warning or knowledge of her susceptibility to such episodes.
  4. Whether the trial judge’s comments or conduct deprived the insurer of a fair trial.

Decision

  • The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Breunig.
  • The court held that insanity generally does not relieve a tortfeasor from liability for negligent conduct.
  • The court recognized a limited defense where a sudden mental incapacity is equivalent in effect to sudden physical incapacities (e.g., heart attack, seizure, stroke, fainting) and occurs without notice or forewarning.
  • The evidence permitted the jury to find Veith had prior knowledge or forewarning of her susceptibility to mental delusions and therefore was negligent in driving.
  • The court rejected the fair-trial challenge, concluding the trial court’s conduct did not constitute prejudicial error.
  • Insanity is generally not a defense to liability for negligent torts.
  • A driver may be excused from negligence if, at the time of the accident, the driver suffers a sudden mental incapacity that eliminates the ability to understand and appreciate the duty of ordinary care, provided the episode was not reasonably foreseeable to the driver.
  • Sudden mental incapacity is treated like sudden physical incapacity when the loss of capacity is without notice or forewarning.
  • When there is evidence of prior manifestations indicating susceptibility, the factfinder may conclude the actor had sufficient warning and was negligent for undertaking the activity (here, driving) despite that risk.
  • Appellate relief based on trial judge conduct requires a showing of prejudicial unfairness affecting the verdict.

Conclusion

The court sustained liability because the jury could find the driver’s mental episode was not wholly unforeseeable to her; only sudden, unforeseeable mental incapacity comparable to sudden physical collapse can excuse negligence, and the record supported a finding of prior warning sufficient to make the decision to drive negligent.