## Facts

- Craig R. Brittain (a U.S. Senate candidate) and his campaign committee maintained several Twitter accounts used to communicate with voters during the 2018 campaign.
- Between February and May 2018, Twitter suspended four accounts associated with Brittain.
- Brittain alleged the suspensions followed controversial political posts, including statements about political opponents and Parkland survivors, and a purported endorsement by then-President Trump.
- Brittain claimed Twitter functioned as a public forum for political speech and that the suspensions injured his campaign and ability to speak and engage with voters.
- Plaintiffs sued Twitter asserting federal and state claims arising from the account suspensions; Twitter moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

## Issues

1. Whether Twitter could be treated as a state actor subject to First Amendment limits when it suspended a candidate’s accounts.
2. Whether plaintiffs stated a viable federal election-law claim, including whether any private right of action authorized suit against Twitter.
3. Whether 47 U.S.C. § 230 barred state-law claims premised on Twitter’s moderation and account-suspension decisions.
4. Whether plaintiffs plausibly pleaded claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, conversion, antitrust violations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference.

## Decision

- The court granted Twitter’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the action without further leave to amend.
- The First Amendment claim was dismissed because Twitter is a private entity and not a state actor under any recognized theory.
- The federal election-law claim was dismissed for failure to identify an applicable private right of action and for inadequate factual allegations tying Twitter’s conduct to actionable election-law violations.
- The court held CDA § 230 immunized Twitter from claims seeking to impose liability based on its decisions to suspend accounts or restrict access to user content.
- The remaining state-law claims were dismissed as barred by § 230 and/or independently inadequately pleaded (including failure to allege enforceable promises, cognizable property for conversion, market and competitive harm for antitrust, duty and emotional-distress elements, and specific relationships for interference).

## Legal Principles

- The First Amendment constrains governmental actors; a private social-media platform does not become a state actor merely by hosting public or political speech.
- CDA § 230(c)(1) bars claims that treat an interactive computer service as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider, including claims targeting account removals and other editorial decisions.
- Breach of contract and promissory estoppel require identification of a specific enforceable promise; general platform representations and policies reserving discretion to suspend accounts are insufficient.
- Conversion under California law generally requires a cognizable property interest; expectations of continued access to a private user account are not treated as property where rights are governed by contract.
- Antitrust claims must plausibly allege a relevant market, anticompetitive conduct, and harm to competition rather than only harm to a single plaintiff.
- Negligence-based and interference claims require plausibly pleaded duty and specific contractual or economic relationships, and may be barred when premised on protected publishing functions under § 230.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed all claims arising from Twitter’s suspension of a political candidate’s accounts, holding that Twitter was not a state actor for First Amendment purposes and that CDA § 230 broadly precluded liability for the platform’s content-moderation and account-suspension decisions, with additional pleading defects defeating the remaining theories.


Brittain v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-cv-00114-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2019)