## Facts

- In February 1945, Gerald L. Brockhurst, a portrait painter, and Clendenin J. Ryan orally agreed that Brockhurst would paint five portraits: Ryan, Ryan’s wife, and Ryan’s three children.
- The agreed prices were $5,000 each for the portraits of Ryan and his wife and $6,000 each for the children’s portraits, totaling $28,000.
- The portraits were to be painted from live sittings, which Ryan agreed to arrange by making himself and his family available.
- Sittings began soon after the agreement but occurred with interruptions and delays.
- By August 1946, Brockhurst completed two portraits (Ryan’s wife and daughter). Ryan paid $11,000 for those two completed portraits.
- Brockhurst thereafter substantially completed the portrait of Ryan’s elder son (“Mike”) and began work on the portraits of Ryan and the youngest son (“Cyr”), but further sittings stopped; the last sitting occurred in September 1946.
- On April 20, 1948, Brockhurst’s representative wrote Ryan stating Brockhurst wished to complete the remaining portraits, and suggested abandoning Cyr’s portrait because the child had changed in appearance during the long gap between sittings.
- In June 1954, Brockhurst sued Ryan for the unpaid balance of the agreed price, alleging Ryan breached by failing to provide the required sittings and thereby preventing completion.
- Ryan denied liability and asserted defenses including the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations. Ryan also brought a third-party claim against M. Knoedler Co., Inc., contending any agreement was with Knoedler (an art dealer) and that Knoedler had released Ryan.
- The case was tried to the court without a jury.

## Issues

1. Whether Brockhurst proved a valid oral contract directly with Ryan for five portraits at the stated prices, as opposed to a contract with Knoedler.
2. Whether Ryan breached the agreement by failing to make himself and his children available for sittings, thereby preventing Brockhurst’s performance.
3. Whether the oral portrait-commission agreement was unenforceable under New York’s statute of frauds.
4. Whether the action filed in 1954 was barred by the statute of limitations.
5. What damages were recoverable for portraits not completed because the patron failed to provide sittings, including the effect of the parties’ treatment of Cyr’s portrait as no longer workable.

## Decision

- The court found Brockhurst proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, a valid oral contract with Ryan for the five portraits at the agreed total price of $28,000.
- The court found Brockhurst was ready, willing, and able to perform, but was prevented from completing the remaining portraits because Ryan failed to provide further sittings; this failure constituted a breach.
- The court rejected Ryan’s statute of frauds defense and enforced the oral agreement.
- The court rejected Ryan’s statute of limitations defense and held the claim timely on the facts found.
- The court entered judgment for Brockhurst for contract damages measured from the agreed compensation, crediting the $11,000 already paid and making an adjustment reflecting the handling of the youngest child’s (Cyr’s) portrait.
- The court dismissed Ryan’s third-party complaint against M. Knoedler Co., Inc.

## Legal Principles

- An oral contract for personal services is enforceable where the agreement, by its terms and practical operation, is capable of being performed within one year; the statute of frauds does not bar such a contract merely because performance in fact took longer.
- When one party’s cooperation is a condition of the other’s performance (such as arranging live sittings for commissioned portraits), the noncooperating party’s failure to act can constitute a breach that excuses further performance by the other party.
- A party who is prevented from completing performance by the other party’s breach may recover contract damages, with appropriate credits for amounts already paid and allowances tied to any part of the agreement the parties effectively set aside.
- The identity of the contracting party is determined from the parties’ conduct and the proof at trial; an intermediary (such as an art dealer) does not become the obligor absent proof that it contracted in place of the patron.
- Limitations defenses turn on when the claim accrued under the proved facts, including whether the breaching party’s conduct prevented completion and when that prevention became actionable.

## Conclusion

In *Brockhurst v. Ryan*, the New York Supreme Court held after a bench trial that Ryan entered a valid oral agreement to commission five family portraits, breached that agreement by failing to provide the required sittings, and remained liable to the artist for contract damages (with credit for prior payment and an adjustment concerning the youngest child’s portrait), while also rejecting Ryan’s statute of frauds and statute of limitations defenses and dismissing Ryan’s third-party claim against Knoedler.


Brockhurst v. Ryan, 146 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1955)