## Facts

- Joyce Brown and Ronald Brown divorced after executing a separation agreement that was incorporated (but not merged) into the divorce decree.
- The agreement required Ronald (the child’s stepfather) to pay support for Joyce’s daughter, who was not Ronald’s natural or adopted child.
- Ronald failed to pay, resulting in arrearages.
- Joyce sought to have Ronald held in civil contempt for nonpayment.
- The trial court found Ronald in contempt and imposed a 179-day jail sentence, with purge provisions tied to payment.
- Ronald challenged incarceration as unconstitutional imprisonment for “debt” under Article III, § 38 of the Maryland Constitution.

## Issues

1. Whether a stepparent’s promise in a separation agreement to support a stepchild, absent any independent legal duty, is a “debt” or a legally imposed “duty” under Md. Const. art. III, § 38.
2. Whether such an obligation falls within the constitutional exception permitting imprisonment to enforce decrees or approved agreements for “support of a wife or dependent children” or for alimony.
3. Whether civil contempt incarceration may be used to compel payment of arrears on this stepchild-support obligation.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the contempt order to the extent it imposed incarceration.
- The court held the stepchild-support obligation arose solely from contract and was a “debt” within the meaning of Article III, § 38.
- The constitutional exception for support obligations did not extend to a voluntarily assumed, contract-only obligation to support a non-adopted stepchild.
- Incorporation of the agreement into a decree could not convert a contract debt into an obligation enforceable by imprisonment.
- The obligation remained enforceable through ordinary collection remedies, but not by imprisonment for civil contempt.

## Legal Principles

- Article III, § 38 bars imprisonment for “debt,” while permitting incarceration-based contempt to enforce certain family-support obligations treated as non-debts by constitutional exception.
- Maryland distinguishes between contractual obligations (debts) and obligations imposed by law (legal duties) for purposes of the imprisonment-for-debt prohibition.
- A stepparent has no general legal duty, based solely on marriage, to support a stepchild who is neither natural nor adopted; a promise to do so is contractual unless law independently imposes the duty.
- Courts may not use incorporation of a separation agreement into a decree as a mechanism to circumvent the constitutional bar on imprisonment for debt.

## Conclusion

The court held that a stepparent’s separation-agreement promise to support a stepchild, unsupported by any independent legal duty, is a constitutionally protected “debt” that cannot be enforced through civil contempt incarceration under Article III, § 38, even if the agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree.


Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273 (1980)