## Facts

- Mark Brown, a homeowner, objected when the City of Upper Arlington decided to remove a 40-year-old sweet gum tree located on city property in front of his house.
- The City’s Superintendent of Parks and Forestry told Brown the tree was decayed and would be removed and replaced; Brown disputed the assessment and sought administrative relief.
- Brown appeared twice before the City’s Tree Commission but did not prevent removal.
- Brown sued the City in Ohio state court, asserting federal constitutional claims (substantive due process and equal protection) and a claim under a city tree-removal ordinance; the state court issued a temporary restraining order.
- The City removed the case to federal district court; the district judge advised the City to refrain from cutting the tree until the court decided the case.
- The district court dismissed Brown’s federal claims, declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, denied a preliminary injunction, and entered final judgment for the City.
- After final judgment, Brown’s counsel told the City Brown intended to refile the state-law claim in state court; the next day, City workers cut down the tree.
- Brown returned to federal court seeking reconsideration and contempt sanctions; the district court denied reconsideration but held the City in contempt under its inherent power, ordering replacement of the tree and payment of attorney’s fees.
- The City appealed the contempt order.

## Issues

1. Whether civil contempt sanctions were permissible when the City cut down the tree after final judgment, absent a clear and operative federal injunction or order.
2. Whether the district court could use its inherent power to sanction the City for post-judgment conduct purportedly affecting anticipated state-court litigation, where no stay pending appeal had been sought.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit vacated the contempt order and remanded.
- Traditional civil contempt was unavailable because the City did not violate any clear federal court order; no formal injunction existed before or after final judgment.
- The district court’s pre-decision directive to “hold off” was an informal understanding that ended when the court dismissed the case and denied injunctive relief.
- No automatic stay prevented the City from acting after dismissal; Brown did not obtain a stay pending appeal or other injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.
- The district court’s inherent power to protect its jurisdiction did not justify sanctions because any future litigation Brown contemplated was in state court, implicating state—not federal—jurisdiction.

## Legal Principles

- Civil contempt requires violation of a clear, definite, and operative court order; informal expectations or understandings do not substitute for an injunction.
- A final judgment dismissing claims and denying injunctive relief does not, by itself, bar a prevailing party from acting absent a stay or injunction.
- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 does not automatically stay a dismissal or denial of injunctive relief; a party must seek appropriate stay or injunction pending appeal.
- A federal court’s inherent power to protect its proceedings and jurisdiction is limited and does not extend to sanctioning conduct that primarily affects prospective state-court proceedings.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit held that contempt sanctions could not stand where the City violated no enforceable federal order and no stay was in place, and where the asserted harm related to potential state-court litigation beyond the federal court’s jurisdiction.


Brown v. City of Upper Arlington, 637 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2011)