## Facts

- Carl Brown ran as a challenger for Jefferson County Commissioner in Kentucky against incumbent Charles Hartlage.
- During the campaign, Brown publicly promised at a televised press conference to reduce commissioners’ salaries if elected.
- Kentucky’s Corrupt Practices Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 121.055, prohibited candidates from offering “material benefits” to voters in exchange for their votes, as construed in prior Kentucky case law.
- After learning his pledge might be unlawful under that construction, Brown promptly retracted the promise.
- Brown won the election.
- Hartlage sued in Kentucky state court to void the election, arguing Brown’s pledge violated § 121.055.
- The trial court found a technical statutory violation but concluded Brown had been fairly elected and refused to order a new election.
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and voided the election.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether the First Amendment permits a state to void an election because the winning candidate publicly promised to serve at a reduced salary.
2. Whether applying an anti-vote-buying statute to invalidate an election based on a public campaign pledge is justified by the state’s interests in preventing corruption and protecting electoral integrity.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
- The Court held that § 121.055 was applied in this case to limit protected campaign speech in violation of the First Amendment.
- Brown’s public pledge to reduce his salary could not be treated as vote-buying or a private quid pro quo with voters.
- Even assuming legitimate state concerns (including corruption prevention and wealth-based distortions in candidacy), voiding the election based on this pledge was not a permissible means under the First Amendment.

## Legal Principles

- Campaign speech by candidates is core political expression; the First Amendment has especially strong application during campaigns for public office.
- When a state directly restricts a candidate’s communication of ideas to voters, the restriction must be supported by a compelling state interest and must not unnecessarily restrict protected expression.
- A publicly made policy pledge aimed at conferring a general public benefit (including a promise affecting the officeholder’s compensation) is constitutionally distinct from secret or private vote-buying agreements and remains protected speech.
- The First Amendment presumes voters can evaluate and respond to public campaign promises through open debate, including criticism by opponents and scrutiny by the electorate.
- Punishing election outcomes based on good-faith campaign statements—particularly when promptly retracted upon discovering a legal problem—raises serious First Amendment concerns because it chills political discourse.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Kentucky could not void Brown’s election based on his public campaign promise to accept a lower salary, because applying the corrupt practices statute in that manner impermissibly burdened core First Amendment campaign speech without an adequately justified and narrowly limited basis.


Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)