## Facts

- David C. Brown suffered an industrial injury on or about October 25, 1972, in the course of employment.
- In 1982, the Industrial Commission of Ohio awarded Brown permanent total disability (PTD) compensation.
- In 1986, Ohio amended R.C. 4123.54(B) to provide that “compensation or benefits shall not be payable to a claimant during the period of confinement” in a penal institution.
- On January 30, 1989, Brown became incarcerated in an Ohio penal institution.
- After Brown’s incarceration, the commission ordered Brown’s PTD compensation suspended, citing R.C. 4123.54(B) and stating that Brown could seek reinstatement after release.
- Brown filed an original action in mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting the suspension was unlawful because it applied a post-injury statutory limitation to a 1972 injury.
- The dispute focused on whether the commission had authority to suspend PTD payments during incarceration when the incarceration bar did not exist in the statutory scheme at the time of injury.

## Issues

1. Whether a claimant’s entitlement to PTD workers’ compensation benefits is a substantive right governed by the statutes in effect on the date of injury.
2. Whether the commission could suspend PTD compensation during incarceration by applying the 1986 amendment to R.C. 4123.54(B) to a 1972 injury.
3. Whether prior cases treating incarceration as a form of voluntary abandonment of employment justified suspending PTD benefits despite the date-of-injury rule.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus.
- The court held the commission acted contrary to law by suspending Brown’s PTD compensation during incarceration.
- The court determined that the commission could not apply the 1986 incarceration-payment prohibition in R.C. 4123.54(B) to Brown’s pre-amendment injury.
- The court ordered the commission to vacate the suspension and proceed in accordance with law, requiring reinstatement of PTD benefits for this claim.

## Legal Principles

- A claimant’s entitlement to workers’ compensation payments, including PTD compensation, is a substantive right measured by the statutes in force at the time of the industrial injury, not by later-enacted statutes.
- Statutory provisions that newly restrict or bar benefit payments—such as an incarceration-based nonpayment rule—cannot be applied retroactively to injuries occurring before the provision’s effective date.
- Administrative agencies must identify valid statutory authority applicable to the claim’s injury date before suspending benefits; reliance on an inapplicable later amendment is unlawful.
- Precedent addressing temporary total disability and incarceration-based “voluntary abandonment” does not supply authority to impose a post-injury statutory payment bar on PTD benefits for an earlier injury.

## Conclusion

Because Brown’s injury occurred in 1972 and the incarceration nonpayment provision in R.C. 4123.54(B) was enacted in 1986, the commission lacked authority to suspend Brown’s PTD compensation during his incarceration; mandamus issued to compel reinstatement consistent with the statutes governing the claim at the time of injury.


Brown v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 68 Ohio St. 3d 45, 623 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio 1993)