## Facts

- Hugh Duffy Brown was charged in district court with a first-offense driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) after legislative revisions classified the offense as a “traffic infraction.”
- The statutory traffic-infraction scheme denied defendants the right to appointed counsel, a jury trial, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Brown, an indigent defendant, moved for appointed counsel, a jury trial, and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof; the district court denied all requests.
- On writ of review, the circuit court ruled that first-offense DUII retained enough criminal characteristics to require constitutional criminal-procedure protections and directed the district court to provide them.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the infraction classification rendered the proceeding noncriminal and therefore outside those protections.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether the statutory “decriminalization” was constitutionally effective.

## Issues

1. Whether a first-offense DUII labeled a “traffic infraction” is nonetheless a “criminal prosecution” under the Oregon Constitution requiring appointed counsel for indigent defendants.
2. Whether the Oregon Constitution requires a jury trial for a first-offense DUII proceeding despite the legislative “infraction” label.
3. Whether the state must prove first-offense DUII beyond a reasonable doubt because the proceeding is criminal in character.

## Decision

- The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s order.
- The court held that first-offense DUII, though classified as a traffic infraction, remained sufficiently criminal in character to qualify as a “criminal prosecution” under the Oregon Constitution.
- The district court was required to provide (1) appointed counsel for indigent defendants, (2) a jury trial, and (3) proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- Whether a proceeding is a “criminal prosecution” for state constitutional purposes depends on its substantive character and consequences, not the legislature’s label.
- Constitutional criminal-procedure guarantees cannot be avoided by reclassifying an offense as civil or an “infraction” when the scheme retains core criminal features (formal accusation and adjudication of guilt) and serious sanctions or comparable stigma.
- When an offense is criminal in character, the state must provide the procedural protections attendant to criminal adjudication, including counsel, jury trial, and the reasonable-doubt standard.

## Conclusion

The court held that Oregon’s reclassification of first-offense DUII as a traffic infraction did not remove its criminal character for state constitutional purposes; the prosecution therefore had to proceed with appointed counsel for indigent defendants, a jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.


Brown v. Multnomah Cnty. Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (Or. 1977)