Brown v. Nagelhout, 84 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 2012)

Facts

  • Willie Brown was a passenger on a CSX train that collided with a truck at a railroad crossing in Pasco County, Florida.
  • The truck was owned by Helena Chemical Company, Inc. and driven by Kim Nagelhout.
  • The collision occurred in Pasco County; Nagelhout resided in Pasco County.
  • Helena Chemical Company (a nonresident corporation) had a registered agent in Broward County and a business presence in Pasco County.
  • CSX Transportation, Inc. had its principal place of business in Duval County and a registered agent in Leon County.
  • Brown sued Nagelhout, Helena, and CSX in Broward County based on claims arising from the collision.
  • Defendants sought dismissal or transfer to Pasco County, arguing Broward County was improper because Pasco County was the shared “residence” of Nagelhout and Helena under a judicial “joint-residency rule.”

Issues

  1. Whether Florida venue law imposes a “joint-residency rule” that makes the county where an individual defendant and a corporate defendant both “reside” the exclusive proper venue, eliminating other statutorily proper venue options.

Decision

  • The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court decision that affirmed transfer to Pasco County.
  • The Court rejected the joint-residency rule as a limitation on statutorily authorized venue choices.
  • The Court receded from prior precedent to the extent it had been read to require exclusive venue in the shared-residence county.
  • The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with allowing venue in any county that independently satisfies the venue statutes, including Broward County.
  • Venue in civil actions is governed by statute; courts must determine proper venue by applying statutory criteria rather than extra-statutory judicial limitations.
  • When venue is proper in more than one county under the venue statutes, the plaintiff may select among those permissible counties.
  • The fact that multiple defendants share a “residence” connection to one county does not make that county the only proper venue if another county independently qualifies under the statutes (e.g., through a corporate defendant’s registered agent).

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s venue statutes do not authorize a joint-residency doctrine that forces suit into the shared-residence county when other statutory venue bases exist; plaintiffs may choose any statutorily proper venue, and transfer cannot rest solely on joint residency.