## Facts

- Two El Paso police officers patrolling a marked car saw Zackary C. Brown and another man walking away from each other in an alley in an area known for drug traffic.
- The officers stopped Brown because the situation “looked suspicious” and they had not seen him in that area before.
- The officers did not suspect Brown of any specific crime and had no reason to believe he was armed.
- The officers asked Brown to identify himself and explain what he was doing; Brown refused.
- Brown was arrested and convicted under Texas Penal Code § 38.02(a) for refusing to give his name and address to an officer who had “lawfully stopped him and requested the information.”
- After a trial de novo in county court, Brown was again convicted and fined; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Whether detaining Brown to require him to identify himself constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure.
2. Whether the stop and resulting application of Texas Penal Code § 38.02(a) were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent reasonable suspicion supported by specific, objective facts.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed Brown’s conviction.
- The Court held that detaining Brown to demand identification was a Fourth Amendment seizure.
- The seizure was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion, based on specific and objective facts, that Brown was engaged in criminal activity.
- Presence in a high-crime area and a generalized sense that conduct “looked suspicious” did not supply the required justification.
- The Court resolved the case as an unconstitutional application of the statute on these facts, without deciding the statute’s facial validity.

## Legal Principles

- A brief police detention that prevents a person from walking away is a Fourth Amendment seizure and must be reasonable.
- An investigatory stop generally requires reasonable suspicion supported by specific, articulable, objective facts indicating that the individual is involved in criminal activity.
- A high-crime location, standing alone, does not create reasonable suspicion that a particular person is engaged in crime.
- When there is no basis to suspect misconduct, the balance between public interest and an individual’s privacy and security favors freedom from police interference.

## Conclusion

Because the officers stopped Brown without reasonable suspicion and then used that detention to compel identification, the application of the Texas stop-and-identify statute produced an unreasonable seizure and violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring reversal of Brown’s conviction.


Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)