## Facts

- William Pena (age 16) was injured on July 21, 1964, when the car in which he rode collided with a truck driven by Charles E. Bruckman and owned by Armored Motors Service (a partnership).
- Pena was injured again on June 11, 1965, and the later collision aggravated certain injuries from the first collision.
- Pena (by his mother) sued only the owner and driver involved in the first collision; Pena’s parents also sought medical expenses and damages tied to their son’s lost earnings.
- A jury awarded $50,000 to Pena and $8,063 to his parents, and judgment entered on the verdicts.
- Defendants appealed, challenging a damages instruction requiring apportionment between the two collisions and, separately, limits on evidence concerning the second accident.

## Issues

1. Whether it was error to instruct that if the jury could not apportion disability between the first and second collisions, defendants from the first collision were liable for the entire disability.
2. Whether the trial court improperly limited evidence about the second accident and related claims.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to damages.
- The court held the challenged instruction was erroneous because it effectively shifted the burden of proof on causation and damages to defendants.
- The court held a defendant in the first collision cannot be held liable for a distinct subsequent injury caused by a later accident, even if the jury cannot apportion damages.
- The court found no reversible error in limiting evidence about the second accident to matters bearing on the nature and extent of the subsequent injury, while excluding collateral details such as separate claims and settlements.

## Legal Principles

- A plaintiff bears the burden to prove that claimed damages were proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.
- In successive-accident cases, the plaintiff must prove what portion of disability is attributable to the first accident when seeking recovery from the first tortfeasor.
- A defendant in an initial accident is liable for injuries proximately caused by that accident, but not for separate, independent injuries caused by a later collision, regardless of difficulty in apportionment.
- Evidence of a later accident is admissible to show the nature and extent of subsequent injury, but collateral matters (including claims and settlements arising from the later accident) may be excluded as irrelevant to fixing damages attributable to the first accident.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial on damages because the jury was improperly instructed that inability to apportion harm between two separate collisions could make the first accident’s defendants liable for all resulting disability, contrary to the plaintiff’s burden to prove proximate causation and attributable damages.


Bruckman v. Pena, 29 Colo. App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971)