## Facts

- Composer Albert E. Brumley wrote the gospel song “I’ll Fly Away.”
- In 1932, Albert transferred copyright interests in the song to a music publisher associated with Hartford Music Company.
- Albert later obtained control of that publishing business and operated through Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc. (AEBS).
- In 1975, Albert and his wife, Goldie, executed an agreement conveying AEBS and related copyright interests to two sons, Robert and William.
- Albert died in 1977.
- In 1979, Goldie signed an additional agreement purporting to sell any remaining copyright interests she might have in “I’ll Fly Away” to Robert and William for one dollar; Goldie died in 1988.
- Robert later obtained William’s interest and controlled AEBS, receiving most royalties from the song, which generated substantial annual revenue.
- In 2006, several of Albert’s children (as statutory heirs) served and recorded a notice terminating the earlier grant under the Copyright Act’s termination provisions.
- Robert and AEBS refused to recognize the termination, arguing the song was a work made for hire and that Goldie’s 1979 agreement defeated termination rights.

## Issues

1. Whether “I’ll Fly Away” was a “work made for hire,” making a purported employer the statutory author and eliminating termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
2. Whether Goldie’s 1979 assignment could waive, relinquish, or otherwise bar the statutory termination rights held by Albert’s heirs.
3. Whether the heirs’ 2006 termination notice satisfied statutory and regulatory requirements and effectively terminated the prior grant.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment for the heirs.
- The court held the song was not a work made for hire and that Albert remained the statutory author for termination purposes.
- The court held Goldie’s 1979 agreement did not and could not extinguish the heirs’ statutory termination rights.
- The court upheld the validity and effectiveness of the heirs’ termination notice.
- The court left in place the district court’s post-remand factual findings rejecting the work-for-hire defense.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory termination under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) permits an author’s heirs, under specified conditions, to terminate certain prior grants made by the author and recapture rights for the extended term.
- Work-for-hire status is an exception to ordinary authorship and requires proof of a qualifying employment relationship and creation within the scope of that employment; without it, the creator remains the statutory author.
- Statutory termination rights are governed by federal law and generally cannot be eliminated by private agreements purporting to waive termination in advance or to contract around the statute.
- A termination notice must comply with statutory timing and required service/recordation procedures; substantial compliance with those requirements is sufficient to effect termination when core statutory conditions are met.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit enforced the Copyright Act’s termination framework by treating Albert Brumley as the statutory author, rejecting work-for-hire and contractual waiver theories, and confirming that the heirs’ properly served and recorded notice validly terminated the earlier grant and restored their rights in the song’s extended term.


Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc., 822 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2016)