## Facts

- Diana G. Brunell worked as a civilian police dispatcher for the Wildwood Crest Police Department.
- On June 2, 1995, Brunell dispatched an officer to a vehicle stop; during the encounter the officer was struck, suffered cardiac arrest, and died later that night.
- Brunell did not witness the altercation but participated in emergency response and post-incident duties, including calling for medical assistance and assisting with notification and support within the department.
- Soon after the death, Brunell experienced anxiety, depression, nightmares, irritability, fatigue, insomnia, and an exaggerated startle response, with symptoms worsening over time.
- By June 1999, Brunell had significant workplace conflict and emotional problems and received a one-week suspension.
- In July 1999, a department psychologist diagnosed major depressive disorder, advised her not to return to work, and referred her for additional evaluation.
- On August 20, 1999, another physician diagnosed Brunell with PTSD and attributed it directly to the officer’s 1995 death.
- On September 9, 1999, the department’s insurer denied workers’ compensation coverage as untimely.

## Issues

1. Whether PTSD must be classified only as an “accidental injury,” or may also qualify as an “occupational disease” under the Workers’ Compensation Act depending on the facts.
2. For accident-based claims involving latent or insidiously progressive psychological injury, whether the two-year limitations period runs from the traumatic event or from when the worker knew or should have known of a compensable injury.

## Decision

- The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the disposition that categorically time-barred the claim under a strict “date of accident” rule.
- The Court held PTSD is not confined to a single statutory category and may qualify as either an accidental injury or an occupational disease depending on the circumstances.
- The Court held that when the facts may fit both categories, the worker may file both accidental-injury and occupational-disease claims.
- The Court held that in a narrow set of accident cases involving latent or insidiously progressive injury, the accident limitations period begins when the worker knows or should know of a compensable injury, not necessarily on the date of the precipitating event.
- The Court concluded Brunell’s claim was not automatically untimely merely because more than two years elapsed from the 1995 incident; timeliness depended on her actual or constructive knowledge of a compensable PTSD injury.

## Legal Principles

- PTSD can fall within either “accidental injury” or “occupational disease” under workers’ compensation law, depending on the factual and medical presentation.
- When a claim’s facts plausibly support both statutory theories, a claimant may plead both without electing a single category at the outset.
- In accident claims involving latent or insidiously progressive injury, the limitations clock may be delayed until the worker knew or should have known that the condition was a compensable work-related injury.
- Knowledge of symptoms alone may be insufficient to start limitations where the compensable character and work-related nature of the condition is not reasonably apparent without professional evaluation.

## Conclusion

The court held that PTSD claims are not rigidly limited to the “accident” category and that, for certain latent or progressively developing psychological injuries, the two-year accident limitations period runs from the claimant’s knowledge (actual or constructive) of a compensable injury rather than the date of the traumatic event.


Brunell v. Wildwood Crest Police Dep’t, 176 N.J. 225, 822 A.2d 576 (2003)