## Facts

- Woody Bruther was an employee at Rexnord, Inc. in Madison, Indiana (later known as Envirex, Inc.).
- On January 31, 1989, Bruther was electrocuted while changing a light bulb at work.
- Bruther alleged that, as he attempted to unscrew the bulb, the glass envelope separated from the base, exposing his right hand to an electrical current.
- Bruther claimed the shock caused permanent, disabling injuries.
- Bruther and his wife, Peggy Bruther, sued General Electric Company (GE), alleging GE manufactured the bulb and asserting product-liability theories (including strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and failure to warn). Mrs. Bruther sought damages tied to loss of her husband’s support and companionship.
- The bulb fragments were not collected and safeguarded immediately after the incident.
- Later, Don Riley, another Rexnord employee, found a broken light bulb in a cabinet near the area where the injury occurred.
- Riley testified he believed the broken bulb he found was the one involved because Rexnord generally would not save a broken bulb, and only a limited number of employees had access to the area where it was found.
- Bruther submitted an affidavit stating that he had recently installed GE bulbs elsewhere at the plant, offered to support identification of GE as the manufacturer.
- Envirex, Inc. and Crawford & Company (the workers’ compensation carrier) intervened based on their financial interests arising from benefits paid in connection with the injury.
- GE moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) Bruther could not authenticate the bulb under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and (2) Bruther lacked evidence the bulb was defective; GE also moved to bifurcate liability and damages. The intervenors moved to strike certain defenses pleaded by GE.

## Issues

1. Whether Bruther presented sufficient evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 for a jury to find that the broken bulb fragments were the bulb involved in the accident.
2. Whether, on the summary-judgment record, Bruther presented sufficient evidence of defect and causation to proceed to trial.
3. Whether the court should order separate trials on liability and damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b).
4. Whether certain defenses asserted by GE should be stricken (in whole or in part) on the intervenors’ motion.

## Decision

- The court denied GE’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Bruther’s circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to authenticate the bulb fragments under Rule 901.
- The court denied summary judgment on GE’s “no defect” argument, finding genuine disputes of material fact on defect and causation that were for the jury to resolve.
- The court granted GE’s motion to bifurcate the trial into separate phases for liability and damages under Rule 42(b).
- The court granted in part and denied in part the intervenors’ motion to strike, removing certain defenses while allowing others to remain.

## Legal Principles

- Federal Rule of Evidence 901 requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is”; direct proof and a perfect chain of custody are not required where circumstantial evidence supports identification.
- Breaks or uncertainties in custody and competing inferences about an exhibit’s identity usually affect the weight of the evidence, not admissibility, and are generally questions for the jury when a reasonable basis for authentication exists.
- On summary judgment, the court draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and does not choose among competing versions of disputed facts; if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant, judgment as a matter of law is improper.
- Product defect and causation may be shown through circumstantial evidence, including proof that a product failed during ordinary handling in a manner consistent with a defect, together with evidence linking that failure to the injury.
- Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) allows separate trials of liability and damages to avoid unfair prejudice and to improve efficiency, including limiting damages evidence where liability is contested.
- Under Rule 12(f), a court may strike defenses that are legally insufficient; in assessing such motions, the court may remove defenses that conflict with controlling law (including defenses attempting to shift fault to a party protected by statutory immunity), while leaving viable defenses intact.

## Conclusion

In *Bruther v. General Electric Co.*, the court held that circumstantial evidence about where the broken bulb was found, who had access to that location, workplace practices regarding discarded bulbs, and Bruther’s evidence connecting GE bulbs to the facility was enough to allow a jury to authenticate the bulb under Rule 901 and to consider Bruther’s defect theory; it therefore denied GE’s summary-judgment motion, ordered separate trials on liability and damages under Rule 42(b), and struck only those pleaded defenses found legally insufficient while permitting the remainder to stand.


Bruther v. General Electric Co., 818 F.Supp. 1238 (1993)