Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)

Facts

  • George William Bruton and William James Evans were jointly tried in federal court for armed postal robbery involving a jewelry store operating as a contract postal station.
  • Evans did not testify.
  • A postal inspector testified that Evans orally confessed that Evans and Bruton committed the robbery.
  • The trial court admitted the confession only against Evans and instructed the jury that it was inadmissible hearsay as to Bruton and must not be considered against him.
  • The jury convicted both defendants.
  • The court of appeals reversed Evans’s conviction based on improper admission of the confession against him but affirmed Bruton’s conviction, reasoning the limiting instruction cured any prejudice.

Issues

  1. Whether admitting a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that directly implicates the defendant at a joint trial, coupled with a limiting instruction, violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction.
  • The Court held that admitting Evans’s confession at the joint trial violated Bruton's Confrontation Clause right because Bruton could not cross-examine Evans.
  • The Court concluded there was a substantial risk that the jury used the confession against Bruton despite the limiting instruction.
  • The Court overruled Delli Paoli v. United States.
  • The Confrontation Clause is violated when a non-testifying co-defendant’s extrajudicial confession that is facially incriminating as to the defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even with instructions limiting its use to the confessor.
  • Limiting instructions may be constitutionally insufficient where the confession is powerfully incriminating and the co-defendant is unavailable for cross-examination.
  • Accomplice confessions implicating another defendant are particularly suspect in reliability when the declarant does not testify and cannot be tested through cross-examination.

Conclusion

Bruton held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is denied when a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession directly incriminating the defendant is admitted at a joint trial, because limiting instructions cannot reliably prevent jurors from using the confession against the non-confessing defendant.